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ABSTRACT 
Battlefield success of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) prompted Department of 
Defense and Department of Homeland Security leaders to examine their possible 
applicability to homeland defense missions within the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security incorporates all levels of 
government to include law enforcement agencies and the military, the predominant owner 
and operator of UASs.  The military, however, is restricted in its domestic role by the 
Posse Comitatus Act, and is therefore limited in its domestic employment of UASs.  In 
order to determine the applicability of UASs to homeland defense missions, it is 
necessary to examine the capabilities of available UASs, to match them with mission 
requirements, and determine the legality of where they can be used and who can operate 
them.  A policy that places combat UAS capability with Title 10 military forces and 
homeland defense mission capability with Title 32 and law enforcement agencies will 
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A. EFFECTIVE USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
This thesis will argue that Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are applicable to 
homeland defense missions, primarily in those missions that require substantial real-time 
information collection and exchange.  Unmanned aerial systems can help governments 
meet increased societal demand for immediate governmental response to disaster and 
civil defense situations.   
The U.S. military has more than five decades of experience in developing 
unmanned aircraft.  Military support for unmanned aerial vehicles has ebbed and flowed 
as systems evolved, but the extensive use of UASs in Operations Iraqi and Enduring 
Freedom openly demonstrated the utility of these systems as battlefield tools.  The range 
of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of these systems 
stretches from tactical to the strategic level.  A testament to UAS value is evident in the 
proliferation of military-oriented UAS procurement proposals.  This intense demand 
threatens to ensnare even the most aggressive UAS developers in producing an unwieldy 
and unsustainable number of over-specialized UAS designs.   
After the 9/11 attacks, the federal government published National Strategy for 
Homeland Security and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support..  The 
former publication emphasizes that successful securing of the homeland requires a 
comprehensive national effort, and not just a solely federalized effort.  The latter 
publication, published by the Department of Defense, emphasizes a layered strategy that 
looks beyond the capabilities of a single agency and leverages the capabilities of all 
levels of government.  Neither document supports an exclusive use of the armed forces to 
defend the U.S. homeland.  Instead, each document focuses on the power of a fully 
networked nation to use rapid information exchange in guaranteeing the defeat of an 
aggressor.  UASs possess capabilities that can strengthen the national defense posture in 
this era of asymmetric warfare.   
In order to facilitate a comprehensive national response to domestic incidents the 
Department of Defense created the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 
2 
                                                
2002.  NORTHCOM coordinates all types of homeland defense missions, including 
defense of the air, land, and maritime domains, and military support to civil agencies.  
One of the first obstacles NORTHCOM was forced to confront was the legal restrictions 
placed on the military for domestic roles.  Since UASs are predominantly owned and 
operated by the military, legal concerns about domestic UAS utilization require similar 
scrutiny. 
In addition to the legal and doctrinal challenges facing domestic UAS operations, 
the regulatory environment may constrain domestic UAS employment.  Military UAS 
operators usually use their UAS assets in airspace solely controlled by the military.  In 
wartime, the principle of air dominance means that the prompt removal of hostile military 
forces from the air domain is a priority.  While maintenance of safe air operations is a 
paramount concern, the challenge of maintaining an orderly and safe airspace is much 
easier in a military controlled war zone.  Civil aviation enters military-controlled airspace 
at its own peril.  Domestic UAS operators must grapple with the challenge of 
guaranteeing the safe operation of unmanned aircraft in the same airspace as civil aircraft 
as well as the populations they overfly.  In some instances permission to operate must be 
obtained from a foreign government if operations occur within the sovereign airspace of 
another country. 
In order to determine the applicability of UASs to homeland defense missions, 
this thesis examines aerial vehicles and system capabilities, identifies broad homeland 
defense mission sets that could benefit from UAS capabilities, and explores the legal 
challenges of their use based on the user and the UASs operating environment.  This 
thesis argues that the information sharing capabilities unmanned aerial systems have 
demonstrated in combat operations make UASs applicable to a wide range of homeland 
defense missions.   
B. HISTORY OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR SUCCESS 
During a mission over Yemen in 2002 an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), under 
direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, identified a vehicle with Al Qaeda 
operatives, launched a missile and destroyed the target.1  This was a victory in the global 
 
1 Global Security.org, “MQ-1B Armed Predator,”  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/armed-predator.htm, (accessed 27 Nov 2005).
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war on terror and for the technological effort that created this new weapon system. The 
concept of unmanned aircraft has been pursued since the beginning of military aviation 
and the technology to make unmanned aircraft viable has undergone a long evolution. 
UAS development began in World War I.  Allied powers filled obsolete trainer 
aircraft with explosives and launched them toward the front lines.  Success was limited 
and this new tactic did not contribute to the outcome of the war or even a single battle, 
but from these humble beginnings aviation technological advances progressed to the 
point where UASs now are a major component of the battle space. 
“By the 1950s, focused efforts in various military projects overcame the basic 
problems of automatic stabilization, remote control, and autonomous navigation.”2  In 
fact, the pursuit of unmanned aviation “has been the driving or contributing motivation 
behind many of the key technical innovations in aviation: [including] the autopilot, the 
inertial navigation system, and data links.”3  Today, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 
offer increased situational awareness of the battle space and can significantly reduce the 
time between threat detection and engagement compared to current intelligence collection 
and distribution methods. 
UAS variants range from small tactical systems carried and operated by a single 
soldier to high altitude long endurance (HALE) systems that can operate above 60,000 
feet and remain airborne for 24 hours at a time.  Battlefield maturity of UASs is 
increasing and proving the benefits of their use.  Unmanned systems have evolved to 
meet the so-called “dull, dirty, and dangerous” missions of the past.  To describe the dull 
missions, the Unmanned Aerial System Roadmap offers an example of a long duration 
bombing mission.  It says that, “B-2 crews flew 30-hour roundtrip missions from 
Missouri to Serbia during 34 days of the Kosovo conflict in 1999…Contrast this 
imposition on crew endurance with the nearly continuous string of day-long MQ-1 
Predator missions over Afghanistan and Iraq that have been flown by stateside crews 
operating on a four-hour duty cycle for nearly two years.”4  During the late 1940s, the Air 
 
2 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, Washington 
D.C.: 4 Aug 2005. p.47.
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p.2. 
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Force and Navy used unmanned B-17 bombers and F6F fighters to fly through nuclear 
clouds just after test detonations to collect radiation samples.5  These drones were limited 
in their capability prompting the military to determine “the risk to aircrew was 
manageable,”6 so subsequent missions were conducted by manned flights, exposing the 
crew to radioactive fallout, and clearly fitting the description as a “dirty” mission.  
Reconnaissance missions have always been dangerous, not only because of armed 
defenses, but because of the political environment.  In 1960, the acceptability of manned 
reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union changed overnight with the shoot down of a 
U-2 spy plane.   
The attributes that make the use of unmanned preferable to manned 
aircraft in the above three roles are, in the case of the dull, the better 
sustained alertness of machines over that of humans and, for the dirty and 
the dangerous, the lower political and human cost if the mission is lost, 
and greater probability that the mission will be successful. Lower 
downside risk and higher confidence in mission success are two strong 
motivators for continued expansion of unmanned aircraft systems.7
UAS developers have produced a bewildering array of systems with the ability to 
fly at high altitudes, others have an endurance measured in days, and still more are 
miniature stealthy vehicles that travel silently a few hundred feet above the battlefield.  
UASs can provide real time surveillance to increase situational awareness and they can 
carry communications relay equipment so command and control is not lost during times 
of infrastructure interruptions or environmental conditions inhibit line of sight 
communications.  Some vehicles can carry weapons for cases where the time between 
target identification and its required destruction is short.  The miniaturization of sensors 
has also provided for the ability to detect the signatures of weapons of mass destruction. 
Now that UA systems have demonstrated their maturity, the potential for 
applicability outside the military domain is becoming an urgent priority.  It is in the 
military’s interest to rationalize UAS development and expand the UAS use at all levels 
of government. 
 





This thesis explores the applicability of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for 
Homeland Defense missions by examining their capabilities, functionality, and legal 
limitations.  UASs are still immature, both as a weapon system and a raw platform, but 
their combat success is generating interest in applying these platforms to homeland 
defense missions within the United States.   
Chapter I: “Introduction” describes the post 9/11 threat environment and the 
changes in defense strategy that led to the UAS to become a much more widely utilized 
and desirable platform.  A brief history of unmanned aerial systems and their current 
capabilities is described, along with examples of combat success, to illustrate their 
capabilities for use in the United Sates.  Finally, the applicability of unmanned aerial 
systems to homeland defense missions is outlined through a chapter summary of its five 
chapters.   
Chapter II: “Capabilities of Unmanned Aerial Systems” describes an unclassified 
subset of unmanned systems and explains their capabilities.  To emphasize the challenge 
facing homeland defense planners, the chapter contains a summary of currently available 
vehicles, sensor payload options and command-and-control architectures.  The chapter 
emphasizes UAS utility.  Beyond the vehicle, the available sensor suites, tailored to meet 
the requirements of the user, offers a daunting array of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  Command and control system architecture offers 
another layer of potential capabilities.  Though this chapter may at first seem focused on 
a tactical level, an understanding of basic UAS capabilities is critical to gain any 
understanding of the potential doctrinal, legal, and operational challenges to domestic 
UAS use. 
Chapter III: “Strategy for Securing the Homeland” describes missions assigned by 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support.  Homeland Defense mission are those missions that defend against threats 
in the air and space, land, and maritime domains, while Civil Support missions are those 
missions where military capability is provided to civil authorities during national security 
crises and natural or manmade disasters.  This chapter examines the development and 
6 
conceptual foundations of Homeland Defense and Civil Support and identifies the 
transition from ad hoc and leisurely legislative branch administration of disaster response 
to a more timely, centralized response dominated by the executive branch.  This chapter 
also examines the military’s historical role in disaster response and civil defense.   
Chapter IV: “Legal Restriction for Unmanned Aerial Systems in Homeland 
Defense Missions” outlines the potential restrictions and limitations on the use of 
unmanned aerial systems in three main areas.  The first challenge is the legislation that 
governs domestic intelligence collection and military assistance to civil authorities.  The 
second challenge is the fact that the military owns most of the unmanned aerial systems, 
but is legally inhibited from using all available assets domestically.  In this regard, this 
chapter attempts to clarify the domestic role of federally controlled active duty military 
forces, (Title 10, United States Code) and explains the obligations of state controlled 
defense forces (regulated by Title 32, United States Code).  The third challenge is the 
operation of unmanned vehicles in the National Airspace System.  Since the majority of 
the missions will require a UAS to operate in the same airspace as other aircraft, 
performance standards and operational practices will be discussed. 
Chapter V: “Applicability of Unmanned Aerial Systems” synthesizes the 
capabilities unmanned aerial systems offer, their functionality within the mission areas 
assigned for homeland defense, and the environmental and legal restriction within which 
they must operate.  This analysis will discuss potential applications of unmanned aerial 
systems for homeland defense missions and suggests ways the nation could exploit UAS 
capabilities in a manner that fits within currently accepted legal frameworks.   
Unmanned Aerial Systems offer tremendous capabilities for Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).  They have proven successful and valuable to 
the battlefield warrior, but operation by more than the military will be required for the 
same level of success domestically.  The time sensitive nature of asymmetrical threats 
requires an agile response force capable of situational awareness from the beginning of 
an attack.  Sharing that information across all levels of government immediately will 
increase the overall ability to respond.  Determining the applicability of UASs 
domestically will require consideration of mission capability, legal restrictions on the 
7 
agency with mission responsibility, the capability of the agency operating the UAS, and 
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II. CAPABILITIES OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
A. VEHICLES 
The current definition for “UAV” is published in the Joint Publication 1-02, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “A powered, 
aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide 
vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi ballistic 
vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial 
vehicles.”8  This definition evolved as the capabilities of available systems increased. 
When pilotless aircraft first emerged, the term drone was used.  This term was 
employed primarily because these early aircraft were free flying and had no external 
input or command after launch. 
As technology provided the capability to control unmanned aircraft, the term 
remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) became the standard and was used from the late 1940s to 
the late 1980s. The technical evolution continued and beginning in the late 1980s or early 
1990s, as command and control ability increased, the term unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) was adopted.  Today, the term unmanned aerial system (UAS) has garnered favor 
because the vehicle is considered a single component of a larger weapons system.   
In 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense published the Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, in which the Department of Defense “adopts the 
terminology unmanned aircraft (UA), rather than unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), when 
referring to the flying component of an unmanned aircraft system…This change in 
terminology more clearly emphasizes that the aircraft is only one component of the 
system, and is in line with the Federal Aviation Administration’s decision to treat 
“UAVs” as aircraft for regulatory purposes.”9  This will be examined in greater detail in 
Chapter IV, Restrictions and Limitations.  Another significant reason to describe the 
 
8 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms,” 12 April 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005,  Washington D.C.. p.563. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ (accessed 14 March 2006). 
9 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.i. 
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weapon system carefully is that “cruise missile weapons are occasionally confused with 
UA weapon systems because they are both unmanned. The key discriminators are (1) UA 
are equipped and intended for recovery at the end of their flight, and cruise missiles are 
not, and (2) munitions carried by UA are not tailored and integrated into their airframe 
whereas the cruise missile’s warhead is.”10
Investment in the UAS industry has burgeoned in the last ten years.  Fiscal year 
2003 was the first year that UAS development budgets topped the billion dollar mark.11  
A bewildering array of UA systems that range in cost from a few thousand dollars to tens 
of millions are currently in production.  This explosion of designs makes neat 
categorization somewhat daunting, adding to the difficulty of matching platforms to 
potential mission categories that come with an array of legal and operational restraints. 
UASs are generally categorized as specialized, tactical, or endurance platforms.12  
Specialized UASs are those that carry a specific, single-purpose mission payload or are 
designed to carry out only a single mission type.  Tactical systems can carry multiple 
sensor packages, operate at altitudes of 5,000-25,000 feet, and have mission endurance 
times less than 20 hours.  Broad mission applications apply within this category.  
Endurance systems also carry multi-sensor mission payloads but operate at altitudes up to 
60,000 feet and have mission endurance capabilities of 20 hours or more.13  Within these 
broad categories, vehicles and systems can be further broken down into sub categories 
based on size and lift mechanism.  Virtually all of these systems are being considered for 
homeland security applications. 
The smallest UA systems are classified as “micro” because of their extremely 
small size and light weight.  They are primarily dedicated to tactical observation 
missions.  Two examples of such vehicles are the Hornet, Figure 1 and the Wasp, Figure 
2.  The Wasp is seven inches long and has a wingspan of 13 inches.  It is powered by an 
electric motor and has flown as high as 1,200 feet with a 60 minute endurance.  The 
 
10 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.1. 
11 Ibid., p.37. 
12 Ibid., p.39. 
13 Information used for the general description of UAVs was derived from the system descriptions 
within the first 40 pages of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030.   
Hornet is 8 inches long and has a slightly larger wingspan of 15 inches, but the 
significant difference is that this is the first micro air vehicle to be powered by hydrogen.  
Its design incorporates the fuel cell into the shape of the wing to accommodate enough 
space for its tenth of a pound payload.14
 
 
Figure 1 Hornet15 
 
 
Figure 2 Wasp16 
 
Opponents of micro vehicles might question the practicality of such a small 
vehicle since even the slightest wind might impair its ability to reach its observation 
target, but proponents advocate the advantages of their ability to operate undetected and 
in confined areas. 
Larger, but still tiny, “miniature” vehicles offer a wider array of mission options, 
and more models are available in this category than in the micro category.  The “Dragon 
11 
                                                 
14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.29. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
Eye, Figure 3 is a 5-pound, back-packable, modular unmanned aerial vehicle designed to 
provide the Marine small-unit commander with an organic reconnaissance and 
surveillance capability to see over the next hilltop or building,”17 and is advertised as an 
important integral component for deployed Marine Corps units.  The Dragon Eye weighs 
less than five pounds, and  
 
 
Figure 3 Dragon Eye18 
 
has a wingspan less than four feet.  This UAS can reach a maximum altitude of 1,000 feet 
and has a radius of 2.5 miles.  It is powered by an electric motor and has a one hour 
maximum mission endurance.19  Another example of a miniature vehicle is the Raven, 
Figure 4 operated by the Army, Air Force, and United States Special Operations 




                                                
Figure 4 Raven20 
 
17 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “Dragon Eye Improvements Factsheet,” Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory Public Affairs Office, (11 March 2005). 
http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/factsheets/Dragon%20Eye%20Improvements.pdf (accessed 12 March 
2006). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.26. 
20 Ibid., p.27. 
The Raven is powered by an electric motor and has combat radius of six nautical miles.  
It can remain aloft for 1.5 hours and operates at altitudes up to 1,000 feet.21  A third 
vehicle is the Air Force’s Desert Hawk, Figure 5 which is the “UAV system’s official 
name [for] the Force Protection Airborne Surveillance System.”22  It is a small, 7-pound 
remote controlled aircraft used by Air Force security forces airmen to maintain strong 
perimeter defenses.  It is also powered by an electric motor that gives it up to an hour 
flight time with an operational ceiling of 1,000 feet.23  All of the vehicles listed are made 
from composite material and are man-portable.  Their ability to be unpacked, assembled 
and launched in a matter of minutes is a highly desired feature for the tactical 
environment.   
 
 
Figure 5 Desert Hawk24  
 
The next class of UAV are considered the largest ones viable for tactical 
operations.  The first example is the MQ-5B Hunter, Figure 6 operated by the United 
States Army. “The RQ-5 Hunter was originally a joint Army/Navy/Marine Corps Short 
Range UAS that the Army intended to meet division and corps level requirements.”25  It 
is designed as a “robust pod-and- twin-tailboom high-wing monoplane, built of low-
13 
                                                 
21 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.26. 
22 Master Sergeant Don Perrien, “Air Force Desert Hawk UAV,” Air Force News Service, (27 
October 2003). http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/afweapons/a/afdeserthawk.htm (accessed 6 March 2006).
23 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.26. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., p.7. 
observable composites. [It has] one tractor and one pusher engine to improve single-
engine survivability,”26 and “can carry the Viper Strike and BLU 108 munitions.”27  The 
Hunter weighs approximately 1,800 pounds and can carry a payload of 200 pounds.  It 
has a maximum ceiling of 18,000 feet and can loiter for up to 18 hours.  It flies at just 
over 100 knots and  
 
Figure 6 MQ-5 Hunter28 
 
can be controlled up to 140 miles from its ground control station.29  A second example of 
a tactical vehicle is the RQ-7 Shadow, Figure 7.  It is a “small, stealthy shoulder-wing 
monoplane, with pusher engine, twin tailbooms and inverted V tail unit.  Construction is 
mainly (90 percent) of composites (graphite and Kevlar epoxy), with optionally 
detachable tricycle landing gear.”30  “It weighs approximately 200 pounds and can carry 
a payload of 55 pounds.  It operates at speeds from 61 to 144 knots at altitudes up to 
15,000 feet and can loiter for up to 7 hours.”31  It is launched with a rail catapult or 
conventional wheeled take-off and is recovered via conventional wheel landing or with 
the aid of an arresting cable.32
14 
                                                 
26 Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, “IAI MQ-5 and RQ-5 Hunter,” (30 October 2006). 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/juav/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/juav/juav1298
.htm@current&Prod_Name=JUAV&QueryText= (accessed 5 November 2006). 
27 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.7. 
28 Ibid., p.45 
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Figure 7 RQ-7 Shadow33 
Rotary wing vehicles are not as plentiful as the miniature vehicles but there is a 
strong development effort underway.  The current production model purchased by the 
United States Navy is the called the Fire Scout, Figure 8.  “The RQ-8A Fire Scout system 
will provide the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps reconnaissance, situational awareness 
and precision targeting support. The system is designed to autonomously take off from 
and land on any aviation-capable ship or confined land area. It will provide coverage 110 
nautical miles from its launch site using a baseline payload that includes electro-
optical/infrared sensors and a laser designator.”34 “The Fire Scout's dynamic system is 
derived [from] Schweizer's Model 333 turbine helicopter, which has been proven by over 
20 million flight hours. With vehicle endurance greater than six hours, Fire Scout is 
capable of extended continuous operations.”35  Initial operational capability is planned 




                                                
Figure 8 Fire Scout 37 
 
33 Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, “AAI RQ-7 200.” 
34 Global Security.org, “RQ-8A Fire Scout Vertical Take Off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV),” http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/vtuav.htm (accessed 12 March 2006). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 US Navy News, “Autonomous Fire Scout UAV Lands on Ship,” Naval Air Systems Command 
Public Affairs, (24 January 2006).  http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=22038 
(accessed 25 October 2006). 
A variation on the rotary wing category is the tilt rotor aircraft called the Eagle 
Eye, Figure 9.  “The Bell Eagle Eye has the appearance of a conventional aircraft with tilt 
rotors at the end of each wing that allow it to maneuver up or down and hover. Bell 
Helicopter Textron Incorporation (BHTI) became involved with the Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) program by taking the wind tunnel V-22 model, using off the shelf 
helicopter parts, i.e., engine, drive shafts, gear boxes, etc. and built the Eagle Eye tilt 
rotor UAV.”38  “The Eagle Eye has a wing span of 15.2 ft, is 17.9 ft in length, is 5.7 ft 
high, and weighs around 2,000 pounds (depending on payload).”39  “The United States 
Coast Guard intends to purchase 69 systems for deployment on their National Security 
Cutter and legacy Deep Water Cutters.”40   
 
 
Figure 9 Eagle Eye41 
 
A category of systems outside the conventional fixed and rotary wing classes are 
tethered balloons called aerostats.  Aerostats are not new.  A system called the Tethered 
Aerial Radar System (TARS), Figure 10 has been operated by the military and the United 
States Customs and Border Protection service.  “The current aerostat network consists of 
two sizes of aerostats (275,000 cubic feet and 420,000 cubic feet) and two varieties of 
radars.  The average aerostat is about two times the size of the Goodyear Blimp, i.e., the 
420,000 cubic foot, aerodynamically shaped balloon measures 208 feet long by 65 feet 
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across the hull, with a tip-to-tip tail span of 100 feet.”42  “The aerostat consists of four 
major parts or assemblies: the hull, the windscreen and radar platform, the airborne 
power generator, and the rigging and tether assembly.”43  The two chamber hull is made 
of a polyurethane-coated fabric that weighs less than 8 ounces per yard.  The upper 
chamber is larger and contains the helium that lifts the aerostat.  The lower section, called 
the ballonet, is pressurized and maintains the shape of the aerostat through pressure 
changes associated with altitude.  The windscreen compartment is also pressurized and 
contains the radar.  The rigging contains the mooring suspension lines and the suspension 
lines which can lift the aerostat up to 15,000 feet.44
 
 
Figure 10 Tethered Airborne Radar System45 
 
 
Figure 11 Joint Land Attack Elevated Netted System46 
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45 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.33. 
46 Ibid. 
The Joint Land Attack Netted Aerial Sensor (JLENS), Figure 11 is slightly larger 
than the TARS.  It is 233 feet long and its envelope is 590,000 cubic feet.  This extra 
capacity 
boosts its payload to 5,000 pounds.47  “A JLENS system consists of two aerostats, one 
containing a surveillance radar (SuR) and one containing a precision track illumination 
radar (PTIR). Each aerostat is tethered to a mobile mooring station and attached to a 
processing station via a fiber optic/power tether.”48  The JLENS operates at 10 to 15 
thousand feet and can keep its radar sensors aloft for a period up to 30 days.49  A final 
example of the aerostat is one used in Operation Enduring Freedom called the Rapidly 
Elevated Aerostat Platform (REAP). 
 
 
Figure 12 Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform50 
 
“This 31-feet long aerostat is much smaller than the TARS, and operates at only 300 feet 
above the battlefield. It is designed for rapid deployment (approximately 5 minutes) from 
the back of a HMMWV and carries daytime and night vision cameras.”51  It has the 
capability to lift a 35 pound payload and maintain its altitude for up to 10 days.52  
18 
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Aerostats by definition are tethered and are somewhat vulnerable in contrast to the next 
category of vehicles, airships, which are controllable and can be repositioned as mission 
needs dictate. 
 Airships are not currently operational in defense missions but development of 
their capabilities is underway.  One of the critical components of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance is persistence.  Typical powered aircraft are unable to 
provide the loiter time needed for plausible persistence, whereas airships have the 
potential to measure their time aloft in weeks or even months.  These vehicles can vary in 
size depending on the type of mission they are designed to perform.  Payload weight is 
not a limiting factor because large airship designs are necessary to reach and maintain 
altitudes above 65,000 feet where weather, the jet stream, and other air traffic are absent.  
The niche between unmanned vehicles and satellites is the mission area that airships 
could potentially fill.   
A final special mission vehicle worth noting is the parafoil.  Two examples are 
the SnowGoose, Figure 13 and Onyx, Figure 14 used by the United States Special 
Operations Command.   
 
 
Figure 13 SnowGoose53 
 
The SnowGoose is a powered, programmable, GPS guided parafoil with 
modular payload bays that can carry up to six individual payload or fuel 
bins.  [It] can be ground launched from a HMMWV or air-deployed from 
a C-130, C-141, or C-17 at altitudes up to 25,000 feet. From the ground, it 
19 
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can climb to 18,000 feet. It can carry up to 575 pounds of leaflets, 
supplies, or other fixed cargo payloads with an endurance of 1-3 hours or 
it can stay aloft with a 75 pound payload for 14-16 hours. (Note: 
Endurance is a function of the selection of ground launch or air launch 
parachute kit, with greater endurance achieved in its ground launch 
configuration). The SnowGoose is designed to operate with only four 
[ground crew] with a turn-around time of less than four hours between 
uses.54   
 
Figure 14 Onyx55 
 
The Onyx is an autonomously guided parafoil system that, in contrast to 
the SnowGoose, is not powered.  “Onyx systems are air-deployed from C-
130, C-141, or C-17 at up to 35,000 ft., and autonomously glide over 30 
miles and land cargo within 150 ft. of a target.  Cargo for ground and 
special operations forces includes food and water, medical supplies, fuel, 
munitions and other critical battlefield payloads. Onyx includes advanced 
capabilities such as flocking (formation flying), active collision avoidance, 
and adaptive control (self-learning functions). With this technology, 
multiple systems (50+) can be deployed in the same airspace, guiding 
payloads to one, or multiple targets without possibility of midair 
collisions. Smaller versions have been developed to precisely deliver 
sensors or submunitions.56
Arguably the most well known unmanned vehicle is the Predator.  It began as the 
RQ-1 and was intended as a tactical, medium altitude, long endurance unmanned vehicle.  
This version is powered by an internal combustion, 101 horsepower Rotax engine and has 
a maximum takeoff weight of 2,250 pounds.  It cruises between 84 and 135 miles per 
hour and has an operating range up to 400 nautical miles at altitudes as high as 25,000 
20 
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feet.57  Its loiter time was dependent on vehicle configuration but could reach 24 hours.  
The evolutionary process produced a turbine powered variant called the MQ-9 Predator 
B, Figure 15 which was subsequently renamed the Reaper in September 2006,58 with 
capabilities more closely aligned with strategic UASs.  The MQ-9 is significantly more 
capable than the RQ-1 based primarily on its turboprop powerplant and slightly larger 
size.  It is 18 feet longer and has a wingspan 9 feet more than the RQ-1 which gives this 
vehicle an ability to carry an 800 pound internal payload and 3000 pound external 
payload.  Its enhanced performance of 220 knots maximum speed, a loiter capability of 
up to 30 hours, and a maximum altitude of 50,000 feet qualifies it as medium to high 
altitude, long endurance system.59  The latest variant of the Predator is called the Mariner 
and was designed specifically with homeland security border and maritime defense 
mission in mind.  The wingspan increased by 20 feet over the MQ-9 to a total of 86 feet 
but the payload capacity was reduced to 1,150 pounds internally and 2,000 externally for 
a total of 3,150 pounds.  The decrease in payload weight and longer wing combines to 
produce a maximum airspeed of 240 knots, a ceiling of 52,000 feet and a loiter time of up 




                                                
Figure 15 Mariner Variant of Predator61 
 
57 Department of the Air Force, “MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” Air Combat Command 
Public Affairs Office, (October 2005). http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=122&page=1 
(accessed 12 March 2006). 
58 Air Force Link, “Reaper' Moniker Given to MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” (14 September 
2006). http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123027012 (accessed 20 November 2006).
59 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.10. 
60 General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, “Mariner,” (November 2006). http://www.ga-
asi.com/products/mariner.php (accessed 5 November 2006). 
61 Military.com, “BORDERLINE: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Homeland Security,” 
http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_HomelandUAV,,00.html (accessed 8 November 
2006). 
The MQ-4 Global Hawk, Figure 16 is the largest and heaviest vehicle in the high 
altitude long-endurance (HALE) category as of this writing.  “Global Hawk, which has a 
wing- span of 116 feet (35.3 meters) and is 44 feet (13.4 meters) long, can range as far as 
 
 
Figure 16 MQ-4 Global Hawk62 
 
12,000 nautical miles, at altitudes up to 65,000 feet (19,812 meters), flying at speeds 
approaching 340 knots (about 400 mph) for as long as 35 hours.  During a typical 
mission, the aircraft can fly 1,200 miles to an area of interest and remain on station for 24 
hours.”63  Modifications to this vehicle are underway and subsequent production aircraft 
will have a slightly longer wing, a more powerful engine, and an increased payload 
capacity of just over 1,000 pounds.  The trade-off is a 5,000 foot lower ceiling, a 30 knot 
decrease in loiter speed, and a 4 hour reduction in endurance.64
These vehicles are designed for endurance and altitude and serve the purpose of 
getting the ISR sensors into their optimal position for persistent surveillance.  As 
impressive as they are, the reality is that they are nothing more than the transport 
platform for the mission payload. 
B. PAYLOAD 
The UAS Roadmap says “payloads currently in use or envisioned for use on 
[unmanned aircraft] (UA) fall into the four general categories of sensors (electro-optical, 
22 
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radar, signals, meteorological, chem-bio), relay (communications, navigation signals), 
weapons, and cargo (leaflets, supplies), or combinations of these. The desire for 
endurance in many UA demands a high fuel fraction, resulting in a corresponding low 
payload fraction, typically 10 to 20 percent of gross weight.”65  As a result, the 
miniaturization of sensors is ongoing in order to increase the loiter times of current 
vehicles.  The mission applications for domestic homeland defense are different from 
those in the traditional combat environment where “find, fix, and finish” is accomplished 
by an armed UAS.  Domestic UAS use will only include the find and fix elements of the 
combat environment, leaving the “finish” element to the most appropriate agency.  As a 
result, this thesis will focus on ISR sensors and communication relay packages as those 
most likely for homeland defense missions.   
“The dominant requirement for sensing is for imaging (visible, infrared, and 
radar), followed by signals (for the SIGINT and SEAD missions), chemical (WMD), 
biological (WMD), radiological (WMD), meteorological (METOC), and magnetic (anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) and [mine countermeasures] MCM).”66  The advanced sensors 
we have today (visible, infrared, and radar) stem from battlefield rules of engagement for 
positive identification before engagement.67  More simply stated we needed to be sure 
that what we were looking at was in fact what we wanted to destroy.  Seeing the target is 
accomplished via multiple sensors. 
Electro-optical (EO) systems are sensors that use cameras to collect imagery.  
Cameras began as wet film cameras that required the processing of its film after 
completing the reconnaissance mission.  Wet Film cameras were made increasingly 
smaller over time, but technology has progressed to the digital realm instead of film.  Still 
images are still useful, but the ability to collect digital video imagery, Figure 17 also 
exists and produces the added benefit of being able to track moving targets.  Commercial 
technology has miniaturized video cameras to acceptable size and weight measurements 
 
65 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.56. 
66 Ibid., p.58. 
67 Ibid. 
for unmanned aircraft and their presence is found on almost all of the sensor packages 
installed.  In addition to daytime video, current camera systems can detect images in low 
 
                  
Figure 17 Video Imagery68 
 
light conditions, but their effectiveness is limited as light levels diminish.  To maintain 
the ability to see under low and no light conditions, sensor packages often pair electro 
optical cameras with infrared cameras. 
Infrared light lies between the visible and microwave portions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  Infrared light has a range of wavelengths, just 
like visible light has wavelengths that range from red light to violet.  
"Near infrared" light is closest in wavelength to visible light and "far 
infrared" is closer to the microwave region of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  The longer, far infrared wavelengths are about the size of a pin 
head and the shorter, near infrared ones are the size of cells, or are 
microscopic.69
Infrared cameras detect these emissions and assign colors to different temperature 
ranges, creating an image, Figure 18 that the human eye can interpret.  Visible light levels 
do not affect their ability to operate. 
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Figure 18 Infrared Imagery70 
 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is the next step when low light levels prevent the 
use of electro optical cameras and visibility levels prevent the use of infrared sensors.  
“SAR is a sophisticated all-weather sensor capable of providing photographic-like images 
through clouds, in rain or fog and in day or night conditions.”71   
Compared to real aperture radar, synthetic aperture radar synthetically 
increases the antenna's size or aperture to increase the image resolution.  
As the platform carrying the radar moves, a pulse is transmitted at 
multiple positions.  The return echoes pass through the receiver and are 
recorded in an “echo store.”  Because the radar is moving relative to the 
ground, the returned echoes are Doppler-shifted (negatively as the radar 
approaches a target, positively as it moves away).  Comparing the 
Doppler-shifted frequencies to a reference frequency allows many 
returned signals to be focused on a single point, effectively increasing the 
length of the antenna that is imaging that particular point.72   
The Sandia National Laboratory in collaboration with the General Atomics 
Corporation has created a SAR for the Predator called the Lynx which has the capability 
to execute the onboard processing just described.  “Flying at an altitude of 25,000 feet, 
the Lynx SAR can produce one-foot resolution imagery at standoff distances of up to 55 
kilometers. At a resolution of four inches, the radar can make images of scenes which are 
25 kilometers away (about 16 miles) even through clouds and light rain.”73  As 
mentioned earlier, high resolution video was an advantage over still images because it 
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provided the ability to track moving targets.  The presence of visibility restrictions does 
not take away that capability because of the SAR.  “A Ground moving target indicator 
(GMTI) system uses the Doppler shift in frequency in the returned ("bouncing") signal to 
distinguish moving ground vehicles from their stationary surroundings.”74   
 
 
Figure 19 Visual Image75 
 
 
Figure 20 SAR Image76 
 
Multi spectral imagery (MSI) and hyper spectral imagery (HIS) are an additional 
capability now available on unmanned aircraft.  This technology has historically been 
more closely associated with satellites and mapping functions, but technical evolution has 
made them possible for unmanned aircraft.  “Remote sensing was used by the military in 
World War II, Korea and Vietnam for tactical and strategic reconnaissance and 
surveillance. MSI is a direct out-growth of the operational success of Color Infrared 
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(CIR) imagery of the 1960’s.” 77  The success of CIR prompted researchers to examine 
ways to exploit a broader range of the electromagnetic spectrum and “today, MSI covers 
the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum from the ultraviolet region through the 
infrared region.”78  “The ability to record spectral reflectances in different portions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum is the main attribute of MSI, which can be useful in a number 
of applications.”79  Operation Desert Storm used MSI for terrain analysis, high resolution 
map imagery, three dimensional topography models for mission planning, tracking Scud 
missile activity, and imagery maps of enemy positions.  “Hyper spectral imaging is 
similar to MSI but with data collected in hundreds of spectral bands. The increased 
number of sensor bands provides higher spectral resolution and more opportunities to 
detect subtle spectral differences in signatures that are too narrow to be differentiated on 
MSI.”80  This imagery capability expands analysis possibilities of the electromagnetic 
spectrum and complements electro-optical and infrared capabilities.  Seeing your target is 
important, but so is communicating what you see and unmanned aircraft offer that 
capability as well. 
In instances where communications have been hampered, a 1997 study of UAVs 
as communications platforms concluded that “tactical communication needs can be met 
much more responsively and effectively with airborne communication nodes than with 
satellites.”81  The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency is developing “a modular, 
scalable communication relay payload that can be tailored to fly on a RQ-4/Global Hawk 
and provide theater-wide support (300 nm diameter area of coverage) or on a RQ-
7/Shadow for tactical use (60 nm diameter area).”82  This capability is crucial for soldiers 
on the battlefield where no communications infrastructure exists or terrain makes line of 
sight communications unreliable.  The same applicability also exists domestically when 
 
77 Department of the Air Force, Air University, “Air University Space Primer,” August 2003. p.12-1. 
http://space.au.af.mil/primer/multispectral_imagery.pdf (accessed 12 March 2006). 
78 Ibid., p.12-2. 
79 Ibid., p.12-1. 
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recovering from natural disasters or terrorist attacks render cell phone relay towers and 
the landline infrastructure unreliable or inoperative.   
A combination of sensors is usually the desired payload.  Mission requirements 
can dictate that only certain sensors be sent aloft but industry is producing combined 
sensor packages.  This contributes to the flexibility in tasking or redirecting missions 
already underway.  As an example of a sensor package for the Predator: “The 
surveillance and reconnaissance payload capacity is 450lb and the vehicle carries electro-
optical and infrared cameras and a synthetic aperture radar…two-color DLTV 
television…high resolution FLIR…[and a] Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS-
A).”83  “Other payload options, which can be selected to meet mission requirements, 
include a laser designator and rangefinder, electronic support and countermeasures and a 
Moving Target Indicator (MTI).”84  Maximum mission flexibility is gained when UASs 
are tightly controlled while retaining the ability to work slow, dirty, long missions, is still 
able to respond to swiftly changing situations.  Again, all of these sensor packages have 
potential utility in homeland security activities.  However, maximum mission flexibility 
is enabled by a robust command and control capability.  As a result, the next section will 
examine UAS command and control capabilities. 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Command and control of unmanned aircraft is made up of two basic categories.  
The first category addresses the control of the aircraft itself.  Simple commands to climb, 
turn, and change speed are required for all phases of flight.  The second category is the 
control or operation of the onboard sensors for mission requirements.  The most simple 
example of command and control would be miniature vehicles.  These are typically used 
for over-the-hill tactical reconnaissance by ground soldiers who need to see what they are 
about to engage.  The vehicles are small and only have a basic video camera that “sees” 
what is below and slightly in front of its flight path.  In other words, you fly the camera 
over what you want to see versus panning the camera while on a constant flight path.  
Control of these types of vehicles is accomplished by a basic remote control or laptop 
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computer.  In slightly more sophisticated systems like the Dragon Eye, routes can be 
programmed on a laptop and loaded into the onboard navigation system via the ground 
control station modem.  Once the Dragon Eye is launched it will navigate via global 
positioning system waypoints on its own.  If routing changes are required while it is 
airborne, the new route can be sent via the ground control station modem.  The video 
images are sent back via line of sight radio frequency and have a range of approximately 
10 kilometers.85  This arrangement is an example of a closed circuit system since 
operation is limited to the ground control station and the vehicle only. 
More complex systems like that of the Predator have a more robust architecture. 
The Predator system consists of the aircraft, a Ground Control Station 
(GCS), and a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE).  The GCS consists of 
flight control equipment, sensor control equipment, LOS data link, 
VHF/UHF radio and Ku SATCOM data link.  The LRE contains a subset 
of the GCS equipment, the minimum required for launch and recovery. 
Predator pilots manipulate aircraft flight controls in real time using the 
LOS data link to accomplish takeoffs and landings.  Once airborne, the 
pilot couples the autopilot to the navigation system, and the aircraft 
navigates to selected waypoints.  The Predator LRE has no [beyond line of 
sight] communications, so it must maintain LOS until it transfers control 
to the GCS.  The pilot in the GCS controls the Predator remotely via Ku-
band SATCOM and receives the sensor products via the same link.86
During OEF, the Predator system prosecuted the Global War on Terrorism from a 
fully operational deployed GCS, Figure 21.  Remote split operations (RSO) 
(geographically separated GCS control of the Predator) enhanced Predator capability in 
the OEF area of responsibility and enabled the launch of an additional aircraft to support 
simultaneous or high priority operations. A key element of RSO was the intensive use of 
secure internet “chat.” Chat was initially established between two geographically 
separated GCSs to improve secure communication connectivity.  Chat rooms were 
subsequently established as a means of communications between the tasking authority, 
command and control units, and flight crew.  Another version of  RSO “employs a 
smaller version of the GCS called the Launch and Recovery GCS. The LRGCS conducts 
 
85 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “Dragon Eye Improvements Factsheet.”  
86 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.C-2. 
takeoff and landing operations at the forward deployed location while the CONUS based 
GCS conducts the mission via extended communications links.”87   
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) also saw extensive remote split operations.  “The 
Predator LRE operated from two forward operating locations, and demonstrated flexible 
flying operations that included an aircraft “divert” and aircraft intra-theater deployment 
capability using the two LREs. The Predator system demonstrated “surge” operations by 
simultaneously controlling four airborne Predators for seven days, [but] most 
importantly, the Predator successfully operated across the entire spectrum of the find, fix, 
track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) kill chain.”88   
The distribution of the images collected by the Predator is accomplished “through 
a line of sight data link or via over the horizon Ku-band satellite link to the Predator 
Primary Satellite Link (PPSL).  Video feeds are then piped out to the DCGS [distributed 
common ground system] and the Air Operations Center (AOC) through theater 
communications or the Defense Information Services Network (DISN).  Video is also 
broadcast to a virtually unlimited number of users through the Global Broadcast Service 




                                                
Figure 21 Predator Operating in Deployed Mode90 
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The Global Hawk also has a complex command and control architecture.  Its 
capabilities resemble that of the Predator’s but imagery is collected and disseminated via 
the mission control element at Beale AFB, California.  During OEF the communications 
architecture resembled that of the Predator in that the mission control element was 
forward deployed and all facets of information control were processed forward.  
“Operators used the experience gained from Global Hawk activities in OEF to streamline 
operations during OIF.  Again, the LRE launched the aircraft from a forward operating 
location; however, all operations were performed using reach-back to the MCE located in 
the CONUS, not forward deployed.”91  Global Hawk was able to fly both preplanned and 
ad hoc missions in theater because of the robust communications architecture between the 
mission control element, the combined air operations center and the intelligence 
analysts.92   
 ‘Secure Chat’ via Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) 
was established between the Global Hawk pilot/sensor operator, the 
Global Hawk liaison officer at the CAOC, and the Intelligence Mission 
Operations Commander at the exploitation center.  This provided 
situational awareness and enabled command of the mission in response to 
ongoing operations and other emerging requirements.93
The range of complexity of command and control architectures is important to 
explore because the DoD is moving toward network centric operations.  While the 
smallest tactical unmanned aircraft may not require more than its simple closed circuit 
system, larger strategic systems can be more effective if they operate on a network 
structure.  At present, information exchanges for large UASs like Predator, Reaper, and 
Global hawk “occur primarily between the UA, its control station, and specially designed 
external interfaces, such as Air Traffic Control voice radio and video feeds.  UA 
products, after being processed, flow to external nodes from the control station servers 
through network connections.”94  This, in effect, means that the UAS control station is 
“an edge device on the [global information grid] GIG [that] provides information to the 
 
91 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, p.C-2. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., p.C-7. 
user community, while keeping the UA isolated from the GIG.” 95  “The first step to 
achieving net-centricity involves net enabling the interfaces.  This means creating IP 
based network connections and routers between UA subsystems and the on board data 
link with corresponding network interfaces between the control station data link, control 
station subsystems, and the GIG.” 96  “Functions and products of UA implemented as 
network nodes would be accessible to other authorized nodes on the GIG, not just to the 
control station [and] the UA itself becomes an edge device on the GIG, [Figure 22].”97   
 
 
Figure 22 UA progression from circuit based to net-centric communications98 
 
Future success of unmanned aircraft will rely on their ability to provide situational 
awareness to those who need the sensor data collected.  The battlefield soldier, military 
commanders, border patrol agents, United States Coast Guard, and law enforcement 
officials could all benefit from real time access to this information.  As these systems 
mature, the focus will shift from the operator/consumer paradigm to the assumption of 
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III. STRATEGY FOR SECURING THE HOMELAND 
A. HOMELAND DEFENSE EVOLUTION SINCE WORLD WAR II 
The present day organizational structure and responsibility for providing 
homeland security is the product of an evolutionary process.  The pursuit of “the most 
economical, efficient, and effective arrangements for protecting the nation” 99 began well 
before the Declaration of Independence and will continue indefinitely. 
Until 1950, the federal government was intermittently involved in disaster relief.  
“Occasionally, Congress would pass special relief measures to help people, as well as 
state and local governments, recover from certain serious disasters.”100  Examples of 
such legislation include: the “Act of January 24, 1827 (6 stat. 356, ch. 3): Appropriations 
of $20,000 for relief of fire sufferers of Alexandria D.C. (now Virginia),”101  The “Act of 
April 23, 1875 (18 Stat. 34, ch. 125): Issue of food and Army clothing to sufferers from 
overflow of lower Mississippi River; no amount specified,”102 and the “Act of May 18, 
1898 (30 Stat. 419, ch. 345) : Issue of subsistence, medical, and quartermaster’s supplies 
etc. to destitute inhabitants of Cuba.  No amount specified.”103 Congress provided 
specific legislation for disaster relief a total of 122 times between 1803 and 1944.104  
Often this occurred with little involvement or policy guidance from the president.105  In 
general, the department or agency most suited to provide relief was tasked and, more than 
not, the military was the most capable agency for providing local relief.  This policy 
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practice, although leisurely and ad hoc, ensured that some relief was eventually provided 
to those affected by a disaster.  This policy of disaster response was practiced until the 
Cold War, when efforts to secure the U.S. homeland began to force a shift toward defense 
and vulnerability mitigation.  Since the federal agencies capable of responding to military 
aggression were also the ones that had historically provided disaster relief, combining 
these functions seemed logical.106
During World War II civil defense was widely considered to be a state 
responsibility but immediately following the war federal organizations began to evolve in 
response to war-related concerns.  “These included the following: 
• Continuity of government,  
• adequacy of critical resources and capacities such as food, medicine, 
communications, and transportation; 
• industrial mobilization for military response needs in time of war or 
national security emergency, and  
• civil defense--localized emergency protective and response measures in 
the event of an attack.”107   
The government’s capabilities to respond to defense requirements were 
sometimes distinct, but also overlapped the requirements to meet disaster relief 
requirements.108   
The first comprehensive effort to mitigate government shortcomings in disaster 
relief legislation was the Disaster Relief Act of 1950.  It authorized all federal agencies to 
provide assistance to states and localities once the President determined that relief 
requirements had exceeded a state’s capabilities.  In the event of such a disaster, the 
federal government then would provide “equipment, supplies, facilities, personnel, and 
other resources,”109 as required.  
In order to effectively provide federal government relief, an office to coordinate 
such efforts was required.  In March 1951, President Truman delegated emergency 
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management authority to the Housing and Home Finance Administrator.110  This 
arrangement lasted until 1953 when Truman turned this authority over to the Federal 
Civil Defense Administration.111  The responsibility to provide disaster relief and civil 
defense functions was moved or distributed to several agencies between 1950 and 2006 
and is outlined in Tables 1-5.  In 1969, President Nixon signed the Disaster Relief Act of 
1969 and vested most of the authority under this act in the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness (OEP).  As a result, “the gap between civil defense and natural disasters 
narrowed.”112  The OEP had considerable authority but political pressures eventually 
resulted in the decentralizing of its powers.  To avoid such pressure in the future, 
President Nixon retained all authority within the office of the President and distributed 
responsibility for response activity.  He charged the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development with preparedness for and relief of civil emergencies and disasters, the 
General Services Administration was given responsibility for continuity of government, 
Treasury was charged with investigating imports that might threaten national security, 
and civil defense was once again placed in the Department of Defense.113
According to a 1977 study conducted by the National Governor’s Association,114 
the redistributed responsibilities fragmented civil defense capabilities within the federal 
government and slowed the overall federal response to disasters.  As a result of this study 
President Carter submitted a reorganization plan to Congress that was quickly approved.  
On March 31, 1979, President Carter issued an executive order establishing the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as an independent agency.  One of the more 
significant responsibilities given to FEMA was the authority to coordinate “all civil 
defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance 
functions,” and “preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist 
incidents.”115    
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FEMA continued to mature as an organization even while suffering wide criticism 
after bungled and untimely responses to Hurricane Hugo in 1988 and the Loma Prieta 
earthquake in 1989.  However, a 1991 GAO study determined that “FEMA generally 
fulfilled its statutory obligations to supplement state and local efforts.”116  The same 
GAO report also concluded that FEMA was “not prepared to take over the state’s role as 
[an] immediate responder.”117  This judgment became evident during the aftermath of 
Hurricane Andrew in 1993.  “In an attempt to address the deficient response, President 
H.W. Bush bypassed FEMA and sent in a task force led by Secretary of Transportation 
Andrew H. Card, Jr., to coordinate the response.”118
In September, 1992 Congress directed FEMA to commission the National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to study the federal, state, and local 
governments’ capacities to respond to major natural disasters.  The study identified 
organizational improvements within FEMA and the reduction of the number of 
congressional committees that oversee it.119  Overall, it concluded that FEMA “or its 
successor would need a more coherent legislative charter, greater funding flexibility, and 
sustained support for building an effective agency and a national emergency management 
system.”120
Dr. James Lee Witt became director of FEMA in April 1993 and reorganized the 
agency and adopted many of the suggestion from the NAPA report.  A significant 
milestone in the agency’s history occurred in 1996 when President Clinton extended 
Cabinet membership to FEMA and Dr. Witt.121 “When forming his cabinet in 2001, 
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Table 2.   Organizations Responsible for Homeland Defense 1953-1961124 
 
                                                 
122 Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
Organization: Historical Developments and Legislative Options, p.18. 
123 Ibid., p.37. 
124 Ibid., p.38. 
37 
  




Table 4.   Organizations Responsible for Homeland Defense 1978-2001126 
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Table 5.   Organizations Responsible for Homeland Defense 2001-2006127 
 
B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND UNITED STATES 
NORTHERN COMMAND 
The threats the United States faces today are different than what the country faced 
during World War II and the Cold War.  Perceived threats to the United States before 
9/11 came almost exclusively from nation-states and the dominant U.S. organizational 
construct for national security was firmly focused on classic military versus military 
confrontations.  Libya or other states that sponsored terrorism were not considered 
dangerous enough to prompt a change in our organizational philosophy.  But the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that non-state actors were now a significant threat.  
Lethality and wartime hardships could no longer be linked exclusively to another state’s 
conventional military might.  As was demonstrated by the 9/11 attackers, a few 
individuals were able to attack the United States from within using its own resources and 
infrastructure.   
In the fall of 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush examined the 
structure of the federal government and determined that the existing security 
arrangements were not sufficient to meet the new terrorist threats of the 21st century.  
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Before November 2002 “no single government agency had homeland security as its 
primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security were dispersed among 
more than 100 different government organizations.”128 To consolidate this dispersed 
domestic security apparatus, the Bush Administration returned to the model set by 
President Truman in the National Security Act of 1947 by commissioning a single, 
unified homeland security department.  On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed 
the Homeland Security Act and created a cabinet position for its secretary.  According to 
the Department of Homeland Security, “the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security is the most significant transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-
century by largely transforming and realigning [a] confusing patchwork of government 
activities into a single department whose primary mission is to protect our homeland.” 129 
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security charged one agency with 
the responsibility for protection of the homeland.  But the legislation did not address the 
domestic role of the military that, throughout American history, has played an integral 
role in homeland protection.  Prior to the terrorist attacks, the United States Joint Forces 
Command was charged with the responsibility for defense of the continental United 
States as part of its North Atlantic regional responsibility.  In order to give a DoD 
organization the same centralized focus as the Department of Homeland Security, that is, 
charging a single entity with the protection of the homeland, DoD had to modify the 
Unified Command Plan.  Those modifications were the largest since 1983 and were 
completed on April 17, 2002 with the creation of the United States Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM).130   
NORTHCOM became operational as the combatant command for defense of the 
United States on October 1, 2002, adapting a mission to "Conduct operations to deter, 
prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and 
interests within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR); and as directed by the 
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President or Secretary of Defense, provide defense support of civil authorities including 
consequence management operations.”131  Though the creation of NORTHCOM and the 
development of NORTHCOM’s mission statement were direct responses to the terrorist 
attacks of 2001, it was very clear that this new command was not intended to burden the 
military with new missions.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. 
Myers, remarked at a special briefing on the Unified Command Plan, on April 17, 2002, 
that “no new missions or roles are being created here for the Department of Defense in 
creation of this new command… it takes the various homeland security missions being 
performed by various combatant commanders and some agencies and puts them under 
one commander, and so we bring unity and focus to the mission."132 
The bureaucratic and military organizational changes were designed to clarify the 
responsibility for executing the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  This clearly 
stated goal, however is not as simple as it appears once the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security is examined in detail. 
C. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
President Bush’s introduction to the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
says that “this is a national strategy, not a federal strategy.  We must rally our entire 
society to overcome a new and very complex challenge.”133  The creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security and NORTHCOM clarifies the chain of command 
when coordinating federal government and military responses, but the strategy does not 
go beyond defining broad activities when specifying organizational responsibilities.   
“The strategic objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, in order 
of priority, are to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
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occur.”134  Under these objectives it lists “six critical mission areas: intelligence and 
warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical 
infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness.”135  
Though the creation of the Department of Homeland Security merged 22 agencies and 
approximately 180,000 people into a single entity, 136 it did not include the DoD and its 
vast capabilities even though the objectives were, in large part, military.  
The approach used to reach the strategic objectives within the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security is multi-layered and the strategy relies upon a combination of 
military and non-military government agencies to counter threats as far away from the 
continental U.S. as possible.  The first line of defense is deterrence, which can be 
accomplished through the show of military force or diplomatic efforts.  If deterrence 
fails, detecting hostile activities in advance of an attack and as far from the homeland as 
possible is the best possible outcome.  The military and the civilian intelligence 
community are both well equipped to detect hostile activity.  Should detection fail, 
engaging terrorists directly with force as far from the homeland as possible and defeating 
them is the last resort for preventing an attack.  In the worst case scenario, the last line of 
defense is a robust capability to quickly recover and mitigate the damage or effects of an 
attack. 
Federal agencies, the military, state, and local governments’ emergency services 
all play a part in the execution of the National Strategy for Homeland Defense.  Because 
this strategy interconnects so many different organizations it is important to distribute 
responsibilities with and within involved agencies.  The broadest means of achieving this 
clearly is by differentiating between security and defense.  Homeland security is defined 
as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
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that do occur.”137  The Department of Defense defines Homeland Defense as “the 
protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 
infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the 
President.”138  Since these definitions separate federal, state and local governments from 
the DoD and the DoD is the predominant owner/user of unmanned aerial systems, a 
closer look at the military’s role in such an interrelated strategy is warranted.   
D. MILITARY ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
The DoD has played a vital role in defending the U.S. homeland throughout its 
history as was described in the first section of this chapter.  The Department of Defense 
“contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland 
defense, and support to civil authorities.”139  In less formal parlance, defense of the 
nation since September 11, 2001 can be viewed as an “away game” and a “home game.”  
Forward-deployed U.S. military forces fulfill the first priority of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security as the first line of defense against those that have hostile intentions 
toward the U.S. government.  However, the homeland defense missions and support to 
civil authorities are the areas most relevant to this thesis. 
Homeland defense utilizes the nation’s military forces to deter, detect, and defeat 
those who would attack United States territory.  Defense roles can be broken down 
further into air and space, land, and maritime domains.  Air and space capabilities are 
robust and have been developed over time as a result of Cold War threats.  The North 
American Aerospace Defense Command is responsible for detecting air and space based 
threats and is commanded by the NORTHCOM commander.140  Defense of the land 
areas and populations are initially protected by law enforcement agencies due to legal 
restriction that will be discussed at length in the next chapter.  Land force readiness is, 
however, maintained for instances when they are required by the President under 
extraordinary circumstances.  The maritime defense mission detecting threats and 
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defending more than 95,000 miles of shoreline, over 1000 harbor channels, and more 
than 300 ports,141 has fallen to the Navy in coordination with the Coast Guard.  
Another related mission area important to military forces is the security of defense 
critical infrastructure.  In most cases this responsibility falls to the installation 
commander who has responsibility for critical infrastructure housed within his 
installation.  In some instances however, the infrastructure resides outside of military 
installations and is important to national infrastructure, not just defense infrastructure.   
Civil Support is a term that broadly defines military assistance to non-military 
entities.  Overarching guidance is published in the form of DoD Directive, 3025.15, 
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.  It defines military support to civil authorities as 
“those activities and measures taken by the DoD Components to foster mutual assistance 
and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in 
planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the 
consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security 
emergencies.”142  As was indicated earlier in the discussion regarding land forces and 
law enforcement, the American style of response to catastrophic events is to handle 
consequence management at the lowest level of government as possible.  This stands to 
reason since crises, like politics, are local.  Once the resources of the local responding 
government are exceeded, other, likely higher levels of government will attempt to assist.  
If the consequence management requirements exceed the capability of local or state 
authorities, the federal government and military can provide assistance via specific 
legislative authority.  Multiple DoD directives dictate how requests for military assistance 
have to be requested, evaluated, and executed.  Three of the major directives are Military 
Assistance to Civil Authorities, Military Support to Civil Law Enforcement, and Military 
Assistance for Civil Disturbances.   
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The increasing role of the military in disaster relief and defense operations has 
evolved over time to, in part, meet the demands and requirements of increasingly 
urbanized society.  Response to disasters, as noted previously, began with the legislative 
branch issuing ad hoc legislation.  The constant demand for faster government response 
to disasters has helped force a shift of response authority to the executive branch.  To 
meet the need for an ever increasing demand for real time information, unmanned aerial 
systems offer real time informational capabilities for all six of the critical mission areas 
listed in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  Even though DoD directives have 
been crafted to outline the legal methodology to employ the military domestically, 
determining the applicability of the military and UASs to specific mission sets requires a 
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IV. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS FOR UNMANNED AERIAL  
SYSTEMS IN HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSIONS 
A. NATIONAL CRISIS RESPONSE AND THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES 
In spite of, or due to, the legislative activity since September 11, 2001, the 
argument between national security requirements and the maintenance of civil liberties 
has reached a crescendo.  Former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
wrote, “There is every reason to think that the historic trend against the least justified of 
the curtailments of civil liberty in wartime will continue in the future.  It is neither 
desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in 
wartime as it does in peacetime. But it is both desirable and likely that more careful 
attention will be paid by the courts to the basis for the government’s claims of necessity 
as a basis for curtailing civil liberty.”143  Before September 11, 2001, concerns about the 
imposition of security needs on civil liberties and privacy were muted.  But, once the 
immediate terrorist threat passed, a lively debate over the impact of security imperatives 
upon civil liberties gained momentum, with the argument focusing upon determining a 
viable balance between security and the protection of privacy as guaranteed in the 
Constitution.  UASs, as an effective means for detecting illegal activities along our 
borders and territorial waters, and for monitoring myriad activities throughout the 
country, are at risk of being ensnared by the Constitutional debate. 
This debate is long-standing, and significant precedents exist to guide the 
development and domestic deployment of UASs.  Unfortunately, these precedents 
suggest an unhealthy oscillation between one extreme or the other.  As far back as 1798, 
the Sedition Act “prohibited the publication of false, scandalous, and malicious writings 
against the government, the Congress, or the President with the intent to bring them into 
contempt or disrepute.”144  Citizens were convicted under this Act, despite their first 
amendment protection.  To correct that imbalance, President Thomas Jefferson “pardoned 
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all those who were convicted under the act.”145  During World War I, the United States 
“prosecuted more than 2000 people under the Espionage Act for their opposition to the 
war,”146 but no Presidential pardons were handed out to those convicted.147  Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court initially approved most federal decisions in support of the war, over 
the next fifty years, the Court overruled everyone of its World War I decisions–
effectively repudiating the excess of that wartime era.”148  At the beginning of World 
War II, thousands of Japanese-Americans were forced from their homes and sent to 
internment camps for fear of what they might do out of loyalty to Japan.  “In 1988, 
President Ronald Reagan offered an official presidential apology and reparations to each 
of the Japanese-American internees.”149   
In 1976, Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) chaired a Senate Committee and 
produced a report entitled Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, known as 
the Church Report, that revealed civil liberty abuses and the evolution of domestic 
intelligence.150  The report indicated that intelligence collection was conducted and 
overseen by the Executive Branch without congressional oversight from 1936 to 1976.  
Identifying subversive activities was the objective of the executive branch until the end of 
World War II, when disruption of subversives was added to the focus.  The report found 
that activities conducted in the name of national security often went far beyond what was 
relevant or necessary for a specific purpose and that “significant weaknesses in the 
system of accountability and control within the intelligence community allowed 
pervasive abuses of the privacy and liberties of U.S. citizens.”151  The report concluded 
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that officials “frequently disregarded the law in their conduct of massive surveillance”152 
and that “all too often improper programs were terminated only in response to exposure, 
the threat of exposure, or a change in the climate of public opinion, such as that triggered 
by the Watergate affair.”153 
The intelligence oversight laws enacted after the Church Report, notably 
Executive Order 12333 in 1981, strived “to limit the number of intelligence agencies 
permitted to collect information on U.S. persons…and to increase control over domestic 
intelligence collection.”154 This order, along with the National Security Act of 1947, 
limited domestic intelligence collection to the FBI and was the first significant step 
toward separating proactive intelligence from reactive law enforcement.  In 1976, U.S. 
Attorney General Edward H. Levi published guidelines for the FBI, which limited its 
investigations to those that had links to criminal activity.  In 1978, Congress passed the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that created the FISA court and required the 
government to obtain a court order before conducting electronic surveillance on a U.S. 
person.  This created a legislative wall between the intelligence mission assigned to the 
CIA and the law enforcement focused FBI.  With such restrictions and oversight in place 
it appeared that civil liberty protection was in place and balance was again attained.   
Since 1976, organizational distinctions developed that highlighted the differences 
between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  The purpose of intelligence is to 
assist in the propagation of informed policy, whereas law enforcement is focused on the 
prosecution of criminal cases.  In general, intelligence activities are conducted before an 
event and law enforcement activities are conducted after.  The legal standard for 
intelligence is “good enough” while law enforcement uses judicial rules and principals of 
reasonable doubt.  Intelligence does not reveal sources in order to protect sources and 
methods.  Law enforcement makes evidence public to gain convictions.  The separation 
of functions by agency and these key differences in operational methodology balanced 
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the security versus civil liberty debate until the terrorist attacks in 2001. Ironically, the 
separation of these functions helped facilitate terrorist operations within the U.S..155 
New legislation was enacted that brought the civil liberties debate, once again, to 
the forefront.  The USA PATRIOT Act of 2002 blurred the lines between law 
enforcement and intelligence gathering by encouraging agencies to share information.156 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 realigned the intelligence community under a single 
Director of National Intelligence and created the Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
within the Central Intelligence Agency.  This center collects and analyzes all intelligence 
related to terrorist threats gained from both foreign and domestic sources.157  The 
Attorney General’s Guidelines for General Crimes was revised and now permits the FBI 
to collect public information about U.S. residents and conduct surveillance in public 
places without a link to suspected criminal activity.158  Sunset provisions required 
Congress to actively renew parts of the USA PATRIOT Act and the more robust 
oversight architecture is comforting to some, but others are fearful of history’s mistakes 
with today’s technology.   
A primary concern is that technology may unduly impact upon individual 
liberties.  Fears of unrestricted and constant video surveillance, loss of genetic privacy, 
compilation of biometric identification, instant radio frequency identification and data 
profiling are widespread, making any domestic UAS deployment difficult.  UAS sensor 
capabilities allow for individuals to be observed, regardless of whether they are the 
primary target or are incidental as part of the public domain.  Critics point to the use of 
security cameras on the streets of Glasgow, Scotland and cite their ineffectiveness in 
reducing criminal activity overall.159  Others claim that the closed circuit cameras put in 
place in Manhattan and Washington DC cannot guarantee that camera systems will 
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increase security.160  An accompanying fear is that the courts will not be able to keep up 
with rapidly advancing technology.  In an important pre-9/11 case, Kyllo vs. U.S., the 
Supreme Court held that the reasonable expectation of privacy could not be determined 
by the power of new technologies.161  More simply put, just because a technological 
advancement gives us the capability to detect something, that capability does not 
necessarily mean that we should use it in an indiscriminate fashion.   
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution is usually referenced for 
privacy rights, but the word “privacy” is not used in the amendment.  It does state “the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”162  “Our current understanding of 
how the Fourth Amendment protects privacy is based on a 1967 Supreme Court ruling in 
which Justice John Harlan argued that there must be “a reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in order to require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.”163   
Public opinion polls can be found in support of either side of the security versus 
civil liberty debate.  The fear that people express about government abuses of power in 
this respect are difficult to assess.  “Perhaps the best that can be said about public opinion 
is that there is neither overwhelming opposition nor support for increased government 
surveillance of suspected terrorist activity.”164  The U.S. Constitution and legislation 
discussed indicates that state surveillance on U.S. persons is legal and guidelines exist for 
conducting surveillance. 
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“To detect and track anticipated air and maritime threats effectively, the United 
States must have capabilities to cue, surveil, identify, engage, and assess potential threats 
in real time.”165  This pressure to fill this immediate need, however, must be weighted 
against the longstanding threat of judicial constraint of UAS operational activities.  Legal 
and historical precedent suggests that the U.S. democratic system, when facing 
competition between security imperatives and civil liberties, oscillates between perceived 
security excess followed by a public backlash and legal or executive restraints.  
Therefore, uninhibited adoption of UASs in the U.S. could spark a backlash.  With the 
wide array of sensor capabilities, along with the ubiquity and persistence of UA systems, 
opportunities exist for UAS operations to be perceived by the public as excessively 
intrusive.  Even judicious and limited UAS use may raise questions about domestic civil 
liberties that operators may not desire—even though the legal authority of potential 
operators are likely to nullify legal challenges. 
B. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE MILITARY’S DOMESTIC ROLE 
The U.S. Constitution establishes the fundamental justification for utilizing 
military forces in all aspects of homeland security. In the Preamble, the Constitution 
specifically states that its purposes include “to ensure domestic tranquility and provide 
for the common defense.”166  In furtherance of these ends, Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, grants Congress “the legislative authority to “provide for the common 
defense and general welfare of the United States…declare war…raise and support 
armies…provide and maintain a navy…[and] provide for calling forth the militia to 
execute the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.”167  Article II, Section 3 
empowers the President and Commander in Chief with executive authority to take care 
that “the laws be faithfully executed;”168 and Article IV, Section 4 requires the federal 
government to protect states against invasion and domestic violence upon request.169  
The legal basis for military support in domestic security generally derives from a 
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Congressional statute or the President’s executive authority.  Historical instances where 
this did not occur was the reason for a nineteenth century law called the Posse Comitatus 
Act. 
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878 is widely misunderstood.  The law in its 
entirety is as follows:  
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.170 
It is surprising that such a short text could be so widely misunderstood.  “Posse 
comitatus means, literally, the “force of the county”; and is that body of men above the 
age of 15 whom the sheriff may summon or raise to repress a riot or for other 
purposes.”171  “Its origins in the United States date back to 1854 when Attorney General 
Caleb Cushing offered an opinion that U.S. marshals could summon a posse comitatus 
and that both militia and regulars in organized bodies could be members of such a 
posse.”172  His opinion was in support of better enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850.  Since the U.S. government was responsible for payment of those enlisted into a 
posse Comitatus by a U.S. Marshal, the use of the Army and Navy was actually 
encouraged.  The largest use of the posse comitatus was in the west, since law 
enforcement was scarce and the environment was extremely dynamic.173   
During the reconstruction period after the Civil War, the federal military occupied 
the 11 southern states that were part of the confederacy and provided law enforcement 
since their state militias were unable.  “After 1868, when all but three of the Southern 
states had been readmitted to the union,”174 law enforcement increasingly became a 
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problem since the status of the Army had changed.  “Attorney General of the United 
States, William M. Evarts, cited the posse comitatus doctrine that gave U.S. marshals and 
county sheriffs the right to command all necessary assistance from within their districts, 
including military personnel and civilians, to serve on the posse comitatus to execute 
legal process.”175  That opinion led to numerous requests by marshals and county sheriffs 
for troops to aid in enforcing the law without requiring presidential authority.  The War 
Department was wary of this trend and sought to participate only in times that did not 
require soldiers to subordinate their role as members of a standing military.  By the 1876 
presidential election, the southern states were capable and eager to resume control over 
themselves.   
After reconstruction ended in 1877, federal troops were withdrawn from the 
southern states.  Congress grew disenfranchised with the excessive use of federal troops 
as a posse Comitatus without the consent of the president, so in 1878 “representative J. 
Proctor Knott of Kentucky introduced an amendment to the Army appropriations bill and 
the amendment eventually became the Posse Comitatus Act. In passing the act, the 
Congress voted to restrict the ability of U.S. marshals and local sheriffs to conscript 
military personnel into their posses. They did not vote to preclude the use of troops if 
authorized by the president or Congress.”176 
Military involvement in direct law enforcement activities is normally prohibited 
by the PCA and prohibits the use of the military in activities such as: arrest; seizures of 
evidence; search of persons; search of a building; investigation of a crime; interviewing 
witnesses; pursuit of an escaped prisoner; search of an area for a suspect and other like 
activities.”177  “The Posse Comitatus Act, however, has not precluded the military from 
providing logistical support, technical advice, facilities, training, and other forms of 
assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies even though that assistance may aid those 
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activities. Using a test based upon whether the military’s involvement is “active” or 
“passive,” the courts have held that providing assistance as listed above falls in the 
“passive” category and do not violate the Posse Comitatus Act.178  In reaffirming the 
ability to use the military in domestic roles, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 and endorsed the PCA as follows: 
The Posse Comitatus Act has served the Nation well in limiting the use of 
the Armed Forces to enforce the law. Nevertheless, by its express terms, 
the Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed 
Forces for a range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement 
functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by Act of 
Congress or the President determines that the use of the Armed Forces is 
required to fulfill the President’s obligations under the Constitution to 
respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious 
emergency.179  
“In March 2003, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command stated, “We believe 
the [Posse Comitatus] Act, as amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and 
no modification is needed at this time.”  On May 29, 2003, DoD informed Congress of 
the results of its legal review, which concluded that the President has sufficient authority 
to order the military to provide military support to civilian law enforcement authorities, 
when necessary.  DoD does not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act would in any way 
impede the nature or timeliness of its response.”180  An important aspect of the PCA is 
who it affects.  The original act identified the Army and was later amended to include the 
Air Force.  The Navy and Marine Corps were not included in the act’s language, but the 
DoD considers it to apply to them as well.  Generally speaking, those in federal military 
service (Title 10) are subject to PCA restrictions.  The state militias are not since they are 
under the control of the state governor (Title 32) and restrictions also do not apply to the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) since they have federal law enforcement authority.181  
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As has been shown, the authority for the military to protect the United States is derived 
from the constitution, but domestic roles less than engaging a hostile foreign force is 
restricted by the PCA.  To illustrate how the DoD executes its “passive” role providing 
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, further analysis of DoD Directives is required.   
NORTHCOM's stated mission is to "conduct operations to deter, prevent, and 
defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests 
within the assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of 
Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence 
management operations."182  In order to conduct this mission with military forces 
domestically, the DoD has published several directives that outline the roles the military 
is authorized to conduct and the process for requesting military assistance. 
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), DoDD3025.15, serves as the 
basis for DoD policy.  Specific guidance is generally addressed under three categories: 
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), DoDD 3025.1, Military Assistance for 
Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), DoDD 3025.12, and 10, USC, Chapter 18, section 375, 
Military Support to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA).  The MSCLEA 
category is the most relevant to military operations of UASs since it includes guidance 
for national critical infrastructure protection, maritime security, support for combating 
terrorism, and border patrol/mass immigration missions.  Also relevant is Executive 
Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, since it serves as overarching guidance 
for the goals and actions of the intelligence community.  One of its main functions is to 
charge the heads of intelligence departments to provide specific guidance for 
implementing EO12333.  The Secretary of Defense accomplished this regulatory 
requirement in the form of Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5240.1-R, 
Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United 
States Persons, which sets the ground rules for military intelligence analysts use of 
information collected on "U.S. persons."  Additional guidance relevant to the intelligence 
community is DoD Directive (DoDD) 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities, DoDD 
5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not 
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Affiliated with DoD, DoDD 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement 
Officials, and finally DIAI 5210.001, Security Classification of Airborne Sensor Imagery.   
All of these directives provide input on the type of support authorized based on 
the request received.  For example, all requests for military support from law 
enforcement will be evaluated against the following criteria: legality, lethality, risk, cost, 
appropriateness and readiness.183  This is important for determining what missions to 
support and what type of support to offer.   
The specifics of each directive are insightful when examined individually, but 
they gain contextual meaning when their content is applied to an assistance request.  For 
now, it is sufficient to know that the legal framework permitting the use of the military 
domestically exists.  Matching the capabilities of UASs with specific missions will be 
addressed in chapter 5.   
An interesting tone was set during the debates for the 2006 Defense Authorization 
Bill.  The Senate Defense authorization bills (S.1042 and S. 1043), would have added a 
new section 383 to Title 10, “which would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use 
unmanned aerial vehicles and DoD personnel to conduct aerial reconnaissance within 
U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility, in order to monitor air and sea traffic 
along the border and coastline, and to communicate resulting information to the 
appropriate federal, state, and local law enforcement officials.”184  Senator John Warner 
indicated that the intent was to “enhance the Department’s homeland defense capabilities, 
including: Providing the Secretary of Defense authority to use DoD personnel and 
equipment to conduct UAV aerial reconnaissance to detect and monitor suspicious air, 
sea, and surface traffic along the U.S. border.”185  This proposal and the addition of 
section 383 to Title 10, USC, was however, not included in the FY 2006 Defense 
 
183 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1997), sections 4.2-4.2.6. 
184 Jennifer Elsea, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch,  Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 6 June 2005. Library of Congress Congressional 
Research Service, Order Code RS20590. p.6. 
185 United States Senate Website. “FY06 Defense Authorization Bill Summary.” U.S. Senator John 
Warner, (13 May 2005). http://www.senate.gov/~warner/pressoffice/pressreleases/20050513.htm (accessed 
18 March 2005). 
58 
                                                
Authorization Act.  The House Resolution 1815 that was signed into law included instead 
section 1035 and the requirement to study and “Report On Use Of Department Of 
Defense Aerial Reconnaissance Assets To Support Homeland Security Border Security 
Missions.”186  This was a significant difference in authority being considered by the 
House and Senate and future debate after subsequent study will be worth watching. 
C. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM OPERATIONS 
Laws examined to this point do not prohibit the use of the military domestically or 
the employment of unmanned aerial systems for law enforcement or intelligence 
collection.  Little adaptation of the current legal structure seems to be required for the 
military to conduct homeland defense missions or for using UASs as an intelligence 
collection platform.  To realize the maximum effectiveness of UASs, operations need to 
be conducted under the same “file and fly” flight planning system currently enjoyed by 
manned aircraft.187   As bright as the future of unmanned system utilization may be, legal 
restrictions on the operation of UASs in the U.S. National Airspace System currently 
prohibit this type of operation.   
The National Airspace System is the system of systems, human capital and 
equipment required to provide for the safe movement of air traffic.188  Two categories of 
airspace exist and are called regulatory and nonregulatory.  Within these two categories, 
four types of airspace exist, called controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other.  The 
categories and types of airspace are designated based on the complexity or density of 
aircraft movements, the nature of the operations, the level of safety required and the 
national and public interest.189  For example, uncontrolled airspace has the lowest pilot 
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certification and aircraft equipment requirements since it overlies unpopulated areas and 
contains the fewest number of aircraft operations.  In contrast, Class B airspace surrounds 
the country’s largest and busiest airports and has the most stringent pilot certification and 
aircraft equipment requirements.  This is due to the large number of aircraft operating in a 
small area, usually over heavily populated areas.  Special Use airspace is usually reserved 
for military operations that would pose a hazard to civil aircraft, such as aerial gunnery or 
other live fire areas.190   
Manned aircraft operate under a concept called “see-and-avoid.”  “When weather 
conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument 
flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating 
an aircraft so as to see-and-avoid other aircraft.  When a rule of this section gives another 
aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, 
under, or ahead of it unless well clear.”191  The issue with unmanned aircraft is that no 
one is onboard to comply with this directive and unmanned systems do not currently have 
sufficient “see-and-avoid” or more appropriately “sense-and-avoid” systems.  The 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recognized the need for operating in the National 
Airspace system and allowed for chase aircraft, ground based radar, or observers in lieu 
of this requirement.  However, these three solutions were impractical outside of the test 
environment so an alternate procedure was put in place.   
The FAA published procedures for special military operation if the form of FAA 
Order 7610.4.  This order established procedures for unmanned aircraft operations within 
special use airspace called restricted areas and warning areas.192  In practice, high altitude 
long endurance vehicles take advantage of this rule with minimal imposition on other air 
traffic.  The aircraft will take off from a military facility, which is protected by special 
use airspace.  It will climb within that airspace until reaching an altitude that is above 
commercial traffic or into uncontrolled airspace above 60,000 feet mean sea level.  Once 
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in this high altitude, uncontrolled airspace it can move freely without interference from 
other traffic.  While this solution is appropriate for systems like the Global Hawk it does 
not work for most types of unmanned systems.  To facilitate their use, an alternate 
solution was devised. 
Unmanned systems that need to operate outside of special use airspace are 
required to obtain permission from the FAA in a process known as a Certificate of 
Authorization (COA) contained in FAA Order 7610.4, Military Operations.  This process 
requires a case-by-case safety evaluation of each flight, so the process can take weeks to 
months to approve depending on the FAA region or regions where the flight will take 
place. A primary consideration in the approval process is the see-and-avoid capability, 
which usually requires primary radar coverage and/or a chase plane to accompany the 
UAV.  The FAA will issue a time and route of the UAV flight to avoid risks to aircraft 
and persons on the ground. The process is cumbersome and is incapable of sustaining a 
high volume of UAV flight requests.  As a result, this severely limits the utility and 
missions of UAVs.193   
In order to integrate unmanned systems into the National Airspace System either 
technology has to ensure adequate sense-and-avoid capability or the legal framework of 
air traffic control has to be adjusted to facilitate UAS use.  Science is advancing the 
former solution as diligently as possible but the solution is not currently available.  So, 
the government is working to safely bridge the gap with regulatory reform, until 
technology solves the problem.  The DoD and FAA are working to classify unmanned 
aircraft in a manner that fits with the FAA’s current regulatory framework.  The vehicles 
will be classified based on their use just as manned aircraft are. 
Category I contains smaller vehicles like the Raven or Dragon Eye who generally 
operate on visual line of sight operations.  This category is based on remote control 
model aircraft and has no regulatory guidance established.  The FAA published Advisory 
Circular 91-57, Model Aircraft Working Standards, that outlines voluntary compliance 
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measure for operators.  These types of operation typically do not occur outside of 
uncontrolled airspace and pose only a minimal hazard.194 
Category II contains vehicles such as the Pioneer and Shadow.  This category 
bases its regulatory guidance on purpose built manned aircraft such as the light sport 
category.  They are not certificated with the intent of operating in all weather 
environments or all airspace classifications.  Unlike Category I vehicles, operators are 
required to show compliance with vehicle airworthiness and operator qualifications.  
These vehicles would be required to apply for the Certificate of Authorization under FAA 
Order 7610.4 anytime they intend to operate outside of special use airspace or FAA 
defined parameters.195 
Category III vehicles are those that most closely follow the certification standards 
for manned aircraft.  Examples would be the Predator and Global Hawk.  Since these 
systems are built for beyond line of sight operation and are capable of operation in any 
type of airspace, both the vehicle and operator would have to comply with the same 
certification standards as manned aircraft.  This includes the sense-and-avoid technology 
that is currently still under development.  The goal is for the Category III vehicles to be 
able to “file and fly” once technology offers that solution.  Category II vehicles will still 
need to operate with the Certificate of Authorization when outside of special use airspace 
and do not meet on board equipment requirements for the airspace they are using.196 
Since a large part of the certification category definition is based on the type of 
airspace they operate in, consideration must also be given to foreign and international 
airspace.  In 1944, the allied and neutral states hosted a meeting in Chicago for all air-
faring nations, to standardize the rules for international civil aviation.  This document 
was called the Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago 
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Convention.197  This event also established the International Civil Aviation Organization 
as the oversight body for international civil aviation. 
Article 8 of the Chicago Convention addresses pilotless aircraft and reads:  
No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a 
pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization 
by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each 
contracting State undertakes to ensure that the flight of such aircraft 
without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be controlled as to 
obviate danger to civil aircraft.198 
This article requires each contracting state to establish rules for unmanned 
vehicles to enter, transit, and exit the National Airspace System.  While in a state’s 
airspace, it also requires that they not create a hazard to other aircraft.  Technology has 
finally caught up with the law and it is time to lay the foundation for unmanned 
operations.  One could argue that this is a significant article in the convention with 
respect to Homeland Defense missions on the U.S. borders.  In the event that civil 
operators conduct such operations this international law would apply.  As the word 
“civil” in the title of the convention implies, it does not apply to “aircraft used in military, 
customs and police services,”199 otherwise defined as “state aircraft.”  This definition 
likely arose out of the reluctance of States reluctance to relinquish control of their state 
aircraft to an international body.200  In spite of this, unmanned aircraft may, on occasion, 
be required to operate in the sovereign national airspace of Canada and Mexico along the 
U.S. border.  Sovereign civil airspace is heavily regulated by Article 3, so the time for 
establishing the legal framework for homeland defense missions is at hand. 
The convention also covers operations in international airspace such as that above 
the high seas.  Aircraft are required to operate in accordance with the rules established by 
their country of registry first.  The second expectation is for aircraft to follow the “air 
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rules” contained in the convention.201  Again, this convention does not apply to the 
military or state aircraft, but legal consideration will be required if private operators 
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65 
V. APPLICABILITY OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS  
A. HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSIONS   
Unmanned aerial systems offer flexible ISR and communications capabilities that 
are appropriate across the spectrum of agencies charged with defending the homeland.  
There is little doubt that the advanced technology empowering unmanned aerial systems 
require military and civilian leaders to give serious consideration to their use in order to 
minimize the time between target detection and engagement.  UASs offer technical 
capability under current legal framework to effectively perform air, land, and maritime 
defense, and conduct civil support missions as required. 
1. Air Defense 
The air-to-air combat role executed by fighter aircraft is not in jeopardy of losing 
this mission to UASs.  At some future time, technology may allow for a UAS to perform 
an interceptor role and engage in aerial combat, but that time is well into the future.  Not 
only will new technology require development, but policy will also have to be amended 
to allow for armed UASs to be flown domestically.  Manned aircraft have historically 
been a threat to the continental United States, but cruise missiles must also be considered. 
Cruise missiles pose a threat to the United States because of their small size, 
tremendous speed and their ability to be launched from almost anywhere.  Cruise missiles 
are relatively small weapons and are difficult to detect because of their size and small 
radar cross-section.  One launched, cruise missiles can fly at high subsonic and 
supersonic speeds.  Cruise missiles do not need the same infrastructure that Cold War era 
intercontinental ballistic missiles require.  As a result, cruise missiles can be moved to the 
optimal position relative to a target.  Short distances between launch site and target 
coupled with high speed increases the likelihood of a successful cruise missile attack.  At 
present, UASs do not offer superior solutions over current capabilities for engaging this 
type of emerging threat.   
In the near term, the sole UAS role in air defense will likely employ the use of on-
board radar for threat detection.  Threat detection in the air domain has historically been 
accomplished through a combination of over-the-horizon radar systems, aerostats, and 
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manned aircraft.  UASs could substitute for inoperative aerostats or ground based radar, 
but UAS mobility provides the added benefit of strengthening the radar coverage area 
where vulnerabilities to fixed radar facilities may exist or radar coverage is insufficient.   
Tactical and high altitude, long endurance UASs are suited for air defense, threat 
detection roles.  The MQ-7 Hunter and RQ-5 Shadow are appropriate for threat detection 
operations that are more tactical in nature, like a coverage of a major sporting event or an 
event of national significance.  As stated in Chapter 2, these medium sized systems 
operate in the fifteen to twenty thousand foot altitude range and have endurance of less 
than 10 hours.  Their payloads can be tailored for radar packages appropriate for 
detecting airborne targets or locating the source of shells, mortars or other airborne 
munitions, and relay information collected to ground stations in real time.  The Hunter 
and Shadow are examples of systems that could be used in specific geographic areas to 
satisfy tactical requirements.  Coverage of larger geographic areas for strategic operations 
would require larger systems.  Global Hawk, a high altitude, long endurance system, 
could easily satisfy threat identification requirements.  As one of the largest systems 
currently available, the Global Hawk’s modular payload capability allows divers mission 
assignments.   
In all cases of UASs used for air defense, operation within the National Airspace 
System will be required.  Currently the Global Hawk is the only UAS with a national 
Certificate of Authorization.  The confirmed advancement of sense-and-avoid technology 
will expand the possibilities for UAS air defense roles, but current technology limits this 
capability to missions over routes coordinated with the FAA weeks in advance.  Only the 
smallest UASs, operated below the floor of controlled airspace will not be affected by 
sense-and-avoid requirements.  Their applicability to air defense missions is however 
unlikely since their communications and threat detection capabilities are far less than 
larger vehicles.  Since the air domain is focused on airborne threats, risks to civil liberties 
is low. 
2. Land Defense 
Defense of the land domain has traditionally been relegated to law enforcement 
rather than military agencies.  The United States Customs and Border Protection Service 
(CBP) is the law enforcement agency responsible for “safeguarding the American 
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homeland at and beyond,”202 the border.  UASs offer significant capabilities for detecting 
illegal activity at U.S. international borders.  The second major area UASs can contribute 
within the land domain is critical infrastructure protection.  Unlike the border mission, 
critical infrastructure protection has no dedicated law enforcement agency for its 
protection.  Instead, critical infrastructure protection responsibilities rest in a single office 
within the Department of Homeland Security whose purpose is to “work with the federal 
departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector to 
implement a comprehensive national plan to protect critical infrastructure.”203  The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security states in its national vision that the “federal 
government will work to create an environment in which state, local, and private entities 
can best protect the infrastructure they control.”204  From this context, the applicability of 
UASs extends now to private operators. 
a. Border Protection 
UASs are well suited for border protection mission.  Plans are currently 
underway to equip the Customs and Border Protection Service with their own fleet of 
UASs operating independently from the military.  The military currently monitors air 
traffic activity along the United States-Mexico border through aerostats and manned 
aircraft, but interdiction of illegal activity is the mission of the Customs and Border 
Protection as a federal law enforcement agency.  The border is a resource-thin 
environment, but to remedy this shortfall, President Bush, in 2005, advocated 
strengthening border protection by increasing the number of agents by 6,000.  There is no 
substitute for “boots on the ground” border agents, but until such time that all of these 
agents can be recruited and trained, UASs can be used to increase the efficiency of the 
current force structure.  If illegal activity is detected, agents can be dispatched to the area 
of concern much like a police officer in a city.  This arrangement frees agents to occupy 
legal border crossing sites and known sites of illegal activity, thereby allowing a more 
efficient allocation of the limited number of Customs and Border Protection forces. 
 
202 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Preventing the Entry of Terrorists and Their Weapons While 
Facilitating Legitimate Travel and Trade, September 2006. 
http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/blue_highres.ppt#303,13,Slide 13 (accessed 14 November 2006). 
203 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, p.31. 
204 Ibid. 
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Predator systems are capable of carrying sensors for all weather, 24 hour, 
detection of illegal border activity but, to do this, the UAS would require mission- 
designated airspace to successfully operate.  Once illegal activity is detected, tactical 
UASs like the Dragon Eye and Raven could be operated by a single Customs and Border 
Protection agent to enhance their local surveillance capabilities in a specific area.  These 
systems operate below the floor of controlled airspace and need neither sense-and-avoid 
equipment on board nor dedicated airspace. 
Operating UASs within the National Airspace System along the 
international border is less problematic than operations conducted in more internal 
regions of the continental U.S..  Civil air traffic along and across the border region is 
limited and that traffic is often more tightly regulated than operations conducted over 
more populated areas.  Currently, the Federal Aviation Administration has established 
Temporary Flight Restrictions that prevent civil aircraft from entering the airspace along 
the border where UASs are operating.  This type of arrangement however, represents 
only a temporary solution.  The only viable long term solution to enableUAS 
employment on the border is the approval of unrestricted operations based on the 
certification of sense-and-avoid systems.  To ensure maximum effectiveness of UAS 
border operations, the ability to operate on both sides of the border will be necessary.  
The Chicago Convention of 1947 defines the airspace above a nation as sovereign, as a 
result, international agreements need to be determined so UASs can legally operate in the 
sovereign airspace of Mexico or Canada. 
Risks to civil liberties are also low since the majority of people being 
observed along the border are not U.S. citizens.  Also, this type of surveillance operation 
is conducted by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency which has law 
enforcement authority. 
b. Critical Infrastructure Protection 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security divides critical 
infrastructure into 13 sectors; of those 13 sectors, UASs are immediately suited for use in 
protecting the defense industrial base, transportation, energy, shipping, and emergency 
services.  While all these areas are considered to be critical national infrastructure, 
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shipping will be addressed in the subsequent maritime domain section and emergency 
services will be addressed in the civil support section.   
The most potential for civil-military dilemmas exists in the use of UASs to 
serve in the protection of defense critical infrastructure.  As was stated in Chapter 3, this 
responsibility falls not just to the installation commander where the infrastructure lies, 
but in instances where the military commander cannot protect the infrastructure because 
it is not contained within a military installation, civilian authorities carry significant 
responsibility.  For example, the Houston ship channel is vital to national defense since 
approximately 80% of DoD petroleum resources pass through this one waterway.205  In 
this example, UASs possess the capability to provide ISR and communication necessary 
to detect aggression and provide situation assessment and awareness for those required to 
respond.  This mission set overlaps, on occasion, with the other critical infrastructure 
elements and, as was stated earlier, suggests that UASs could benefit operators other than 
the military or law enforcement agencies.  
Transportation is a broad category that includes air, land, and rail systems.  
As the National Strategy for Homeland Security suggests, the maintenance of national 
commerce depends upon these industries.  UASs, with their mobility, persistence and 
wide potential for monitoring are well suited for monitoring the physical properties of 
road and rail systems.  The ability to position and reposition a UAS in minimal time is an 
attribute that is called for in this strategy document.  “The national infrastructure 
protection plan will organize the complementary efforts of government and private 
institutions to raise security over the long term to levels appropriate to each target’s 
vulnerability and criticality.”206  UASs offer the flexibility to be repositioned rapidly as 
needs dictate.  This is a valuable capability when applied to expansive sector such as 
energy. 
Energy is a large sector that is made up of electricity, oil, and natural gas.  
Each of these sectors has unique elements but common to all are production facilities, 
transportation and distributions systems.  As with the previous sections in this chapter, 
 
205 Dr. Craig Hooper, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., September 2006. 
206 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, p.31. 
70 
                                                
threat level and vulnerability is used to determine where physical protective measure 
need to be elevated.  UASs can aid in protecting the transportation and distribution 
systems as a result of their surveillance capability.  Most of the production facilities are in 
or near populated areas, however pipelines and electrical power lines transit expanses of 
unpopulated areas.  Industry has electronic means of monitoring the health of their 
systems, but they also conduct physical assessments of their assets.  Unmanned aerial 
systems are well suited for such missions.  Flying over any stretch of the 160,000 miles 
of crude oil pipeline or the 278,000 miles of natural gas pipeline could easily fit into the 
“dull” mission as described in chapter I.207  Regardless, the 2006 closure of the Alaskan 
Pipeline from the Prudo Bay oil field is a valid reminder of the impact reduced oil flow 
can have on the U.S. economy. 
The electrical power grid is another system that has national implications 
if it is disrupted.  This system is made up of power generating and power distribution 
systems.  The distribution system is made up of a network that shifts electrical power to 
areas of the country to meet varying levels of demand.  The system is spread over the 
continental U.S. and is vulnerable in many locations and in addition to the ability to 
reroute the flow of power in case of a distribution interruption, UASs could provide local 
surveillance of a physical asset that has national implications.   
The main obstacle to conducting such operations over the land domain is 
the sense-and-avoid ability required to operate in the airspace above these assets.  Until 
such a time that UASs can freely operate within the National Airspace System, their 
capabilities will go unused.  Only when the threat and vulnerability conditions dictate 
will airspace restriction likely be put into place for their use. 
Once sense-and-avoid capability is certified and restrictions no longer 
exist, the most appropriate agencies to conduct such missions are a combination of Title 
32 military, state and local governments, and industry representatives.  These agencies 
are not affected by the Posse Comitatus Act and are most familiar with normal conditions 
 
207 Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets, Washington D.C.:Government Printing Office, 2003. p.52. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html (accessed 14 Nov 2006). 
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and operation of local critical assets.  Including all of these agencies in UAS operations 
conforms to the national vision stated earlier in this section. 
The UASs best suited for these missions include mini UASs for specific 
locations such as electrical power production stations or refineries.  Small tactical UASs 
that can provide surveillance beyond local areas are appropriate for patrolling pipeline 
and electrical power line segments.  Larger tactical systems like Predator can provide 
persistent coverage over key assets such as bridges or nuclear power plants or be used for 
patrolling larger expanses of pipeline and electrical power lines.   
The risk to civil liberties are low for this mission set as well, since the  
military is performing an authorized mission, focused on protecting physical assets, and 
other private operators cannot use the information they collect against U.S. persons. 
3. Maritime Defense 
UASs are applicable and perhaps best suited for the maritime domain awareness 
mission.  The main consideration behind this statement is the vast expanse of the ocean.  
Defense of the American homeland may at first seem to be only concerned with the 
waters near the United States.  In actuality, national commerce is dependent on the 
international trade made possible via the shipping industry.  The layers of protection 
become more integrated with closer proximity to the homeland.  However, deterring and 
detecting threats as from the homeland as possible, in accordance with the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, is more likely with the employment of UASs. 
Satellites are well suited to surveil the great distances of the open ocean but their 
capabilities are limited.  Since satellites travel at great speed they can cover large 
surveillance areas, but as a result they cannot provide persistent surveillance of a target 
once detected.  At the other end of the spectrum is the surveillance capabilities provided 
by surface ships.  Mini and rotary wing UAVS can be employed from ships with minimal 
deck space enabling almost any ship to carry a UAS and increase their surveillance 
capabilities.  Regardless of the combination of ship based UASs and shipboard 
surveillance systems, surveillance coverage area is localized when compared to satellites.  
High attitude, long endurance systems can fill the gap between these two extremes. 
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The Global Hawk provides the surveillance area capability required for the 
maritime domain.  The aerial vehicle itself has tremendous endurance and demonstrated 
its ability to conquer great distances.  In 2001, it flew non-stop over the Pacific to 
Australia some 7,500 miles away.208  The Global Hawk’s sensor package is also 
appropriate to the maritime environment.  It carries synthetic aperture radar, infrared, and 
electro-optical sensors for all weather, day and night capability.  When equipped with a 
ground moving target indicator, staying on target becomes even more likely.  UASs like 
the Global Hawk provide a layer between the surface and space and strengthens the 
overall maritime defense layer.  As a result the risk to the shipping industry, which is 
critical to national commerce, is also lowered. 
Most of the legal restrictions present in the air and land domains are not present in 
the maritime domain.  The operational restrictions that exist within the national airspace 
system over the continental U.S. do not exist over the open water.  The U.S. Coast Guard 
is a law enforcement agency and as such is not subject to the restrictions of the Posse 
Comitatus Act.  The U.S. Navy is acting in its defense role and has no Posse Comitatus 
Act limitations outside the United States.  Issues of privacy and surveillance are not 
contentious with this mission set since area surveillance is the objective, not personal or 
individual surveillance.  Lastly, sharing of information is not restricted between these two 
organizations like the restrictions imposed between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies.   
4. Civil Support 
Emergency services can benefit from UASs and Hurricane Katrina served as an 
example of the value UASs could provide after a widespread disaster.  Providing voice 
and internet communications for rescue teams immediately following the disaster are 
extremely valuable for coordinating a government wide response if local infrastructure is 
damaged or destroyed.  Area surveillance with image distribution via the internet is 
another capability that could enhance a recovery effort through rapid documentation of 
the scope of damage.   
 
208 Department of the Air Force. “Global Hawk.” 
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The multiple sensor packages available for UAS platforms can aid in search and 
rescue.  Assigning the search mission to a UAS will allow manned aircraft to concentrate 
on the rescue part of search and rescue.  Day and night sensors mean continuous search 
capability without crew fatigue concerns.   
Before Hurricane Katrina, FAA approval of UAS operations requests was 
measured in weeks, but improvements in the bureaucratic process have all but eliminated 
the delay.  In July 2006, the FAA and the DoD established a new procedure to streamline 
the approval process for using UASs over disaster areas.  In less than 6 hours, military 
UASs can be flying over the designated area under the control of the lead federal agency.  
This initial agreement is for Predator B systems only but could expand in the future.  
Predator Bs are projected to be used in intermediate altitudes above rescue forces and 
logistical support aircraft.  Current sense-and-avoid technology deficiencies require the 
UAV to be followed by a chase aircraft until it is on station and within the confines of 
protected airspace above the disaster area.  When technology produces an adequate 
sense-and-avoid capability, UASs will be able to “file and fly” directly to their assigned 
target area without chase aircraft.  Other regulatory arrangements are required for the 
wide array of potentially useful unmanned aerial systems. 
In cases of disaster relief, non-DoD agencies are typically designated as lead 
federal agencies, so Posse Comitatus and concerns about surveillance of individuals are 
negated.  In the case of a terrorist attack, use of the military to protect the U.S. is the 
primary responsibility of the President and the military.  In such cases, the military is 
within its legal authority to use all of its resources.  UASs are applicable to civil support 
missions and as UAS capability increases, only the imagination will be the limit for UAS 
applications.   
B. INFORMATION SHARING 
The element of UAS success that recurs throughout this document is the ability of 
these systems to disseminate data.  Chapter III described the federal government policy 
evolution from early disaster response to current disaster/defense response.  The 
dominant factor that forced policy evolution was the demand for timeliness of the 
response based on the capabilities and characteristics of society in that era.  In the early 
19th century, Congressional action weeks after an event might have been seen as speedy.  
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Contemporary requirements for an increasingly urbanized America dictate same day 
response.  As a result, UASs are a natural fit for a society hungry for immediate 
information exchange. 
In regards to Homeland Security, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
relies on the participation of all government agencies, from the local first responders to 
high federal authority to execute an effective defense.  Since an asymmetrical attack, 
characteristic of 9/11, can originate almost anywhere, the ability to provide situational 
awareness data for those required to respond is extremely valuable.  The military and 
federal government have undergone historic reorganization primarily to coordinate the 
efforts of the numerous agencies involved.  In order to take advantage of the full 
spectrum of response capabilities, establishing and maintaining a communications 
interface capability from local officials to the highest level of government is imperative.   
The Global Information Grid is a system that will connect all government 
information systems for access by appropriate agencies.  Theoretically the battlefield 
commander would be able to see what the infantryman sees in his gun sight, what the 
pilot sees through his heads up display, and what the UAS is seeing.  With such a 
complete picture of the battle sphere, commanders will be better equipped to effectively 
prosecute the battle.  The same concept applies to homeland defense with the lead federal 
agency having access to the information from the local emergency response authorities, 
law enforcement and the military.  The GIG is in its evolutionary infancy and only time 
will tell if its designed intent will be realized 
In instances where sharing information might be of concern for privacy or 
national security reasons, distribution of UAS surveillance information can be accessed 
through internet-based distribution systems.  One possible solution is for the agency 
controlling the UAS to publish data it collects to a server where access to the data can be 
controlled.  This arrangement allows for compliance with legal consideration for law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies and security clearance considerations between 
agencies with and without security clearances.  Ultimately, leveraging the power of a 
network based distribution and communications system will ensure information 
requirements are legally transacted when required. 
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C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Rapidly advancing technology is increasing UAS capability and widening their 
range of applications.  Extensive combat operations have propelled UAS development 
and made the military owner of the preponderance of UAS assets.  However, the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security dictates an inclusive, “national” effort rather than solely 
a federalized, military-led effort.  To realize the intent of that strategy, agencies beyond 
the Title 10 military should take primary lead in the domestic employment of UASs; 
active-duty military forces are not the only entities capable of operating UASs.  Title 32, 
law enforcement, and private industry should lead UAS homeland defense efforts, and 
Title 10 forces, strained by five years of war can continue their job of fighting the 
nation’s wars undistracted. 
State militias are integrated into the active forces for wartime operations, but 
when they are not placed in this capacity they are under the command of their state 
governors.  As a result, the Posse Comitatus restrictions do not apply to them.  This 
allows Title 32 state forces to respond in a lead role, unlike Title 10 forces that are 
required to operate in subordinate roles domestically.  Assigning tactical and high 
altitude/long endurance UASs to Title 32 military forces allows for domestic employment 
of these assets while still maintaining a combat capable force to integrate with Title 10 
forces when required.   
The Customs and Border Protection Service is well suited to operate UASs in the 
protection of U.S. international borders.  Since no military specific training is required for 
their operation, only funding constraints will limit their employment capabilities.  
Airspace restrictions and international agreements are currently hindrances, but do not 
seem to be insurmountable obstacles in this mission area. 
First response and law enforcement agencies around the country utilize manned 
aircraft daily.  The addition of unmanned aerial systems to their arsenal has advantages 
on both tactical and strategic levels.  A tactical level benefit is determining the scale of 
incidents and determining the resources needed to respond.  The 9/11 attack on the World 
Trade Center towers is an example of how a locally operated UAS could have been used 
to help experts assess the physical damage.  A strategic level benefit in this example 
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would have been the single point of reference for imagery.  Such an arrangement could 
have meant the dissemination of the evacuation order to both the police and fire 
departments.  Sadly, only the police department received an evacuation order on that day.   
Congress has fully funded UAS development requests over the last ten years and 
continues to aggressively fund them for the DoD and DHS.  The Department of 
Homeland Security administers a grant program for state requests.  This would be a 
viable mechanism for state law enforcement agencies to acquire unmanned aerial 
systems.   
This analysis indicates that the technological capabilities of unmanned aerial 
systems meet intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technical requirements, 
satisfy current homeland defense mission requirements, and can be operated by Title 10 
military forces or others with minimal legal restrictions.  The Posse Comitatus Act does 
not overly restrict the active military from responding to national crises and current DoD 
directives offer satisfactory guidance describing when military assistance to civil 
authorities is appropriate and how to provide it.   
A short term solution to national security concerns may require the active military 
to answer requests for domestic UAS employment.  However, the long term solution, in 
accordance with the published national strategy, is to engage in a national effort and 
leverage the capabilities of all levels of government, industry, and private citizens.   
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